违规事件在股东联结关联公司间的行为溢出效应  

Spillover Effect of Violation Events in the Behavior of Shareholders-interlocked Companies

作　　者：蒋赛楠 杨柳勇[1] 罗德明[1] Jiang Sainan;Yang Liuyong;Luo Deming(School of Economics,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310058,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院,浙江杭州310058

出　　处：《浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2023年第2期133-154,共22页Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72073120);国家社科基金重大项目(22ZDA029);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金;教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地基金(16JJD790052);浙江省哲学社会科学规划“高质量发展建设共同富裕示范区”重大招标项目;浙江文化研究工程课题(22WH12-12Z)。

摘　　要：近年来,对上市公司违规行为的研究一直是学术界和监管机构关注的重点。违规行为在股东联结关联公司间存在显著的正向行为溢出效应,即关联公司的违规行为显著提高了存在股东联结公司发生违规行为的概率。上市公司违规决策的行为溢出效应主要来源于交流式学习机制和观察式学习机制。上市公司存在共同股东时,有更多的社会网络联结和社会活动联系,为股东联结关联公司间的交流式学习模仿奠定了基础。通过观察股东联结公司的违规行为造成的市场反应、受到的监管机构的处罚程度,上市公司决定是否实施类似的违规行为,形成观察式学习模仿。非国有企业、享受低政府补贴的企业和所在地市场化程度较高的企业,股东联结公司间的行为溢出效应更加明显。违规事件的行为溢出效应与监管强度负相关。监管强度越大,行为溢出效应越小。From the perspective of shareholder interlocked channels,this paper delves into the behavior spillover effect and influencing mechanism of violations among affiliated companies.This paper solves the endogenous problem of behavior spillover effect by controlling the proportion of the associated shareholder-interlocked companies disclosing the violations before the target listed company decides whether to engage in violations.Empirical evidence indicates that there is a significant positive behavior spillover effect among the shareholder-interlocked affiliates,i.e.the affiliates’misconduct significantly increases the possibility of the shareholder-interlocked companies’violations.Due to the great financing constraints,lack of cash flow and fierce market competition,non-state-owned enterprises,enterprises with low government subsidies and a higher degree of marketization in their local areas are more motivated to observe and understand the violations of shareholder-interlocked affiliates,which leads to stronger spillover effect of violations.The behavior spillover effect of illegal decisions of listed companies results from the communicating learning mechanism and the observational learning mechanism.When there are common shareholders in listed companies,there are more social network ties and social activity connections,which lays a foundation for the communicating learning and imitation among shareholder-interlocked affiliated companies.By focusing on the market reaction caused by the irregularities of shareholder-interlocked companies and the severity of punishment imposed by the regulatory agency,the listed company decides whether to carry out similar irregularities,thus developing observational learning and imitation.If regulators step up their supervision,managers of listed companies will not be able to obtain high-quality projects or make large profits through illegal means,and meanwhile the penalties for companies that break the rules will be strengthened.Therefore,the introduction of the policy to enhanc

关 键 词：违规事件 股东联结 溢出效应 学习机制 监管强度 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]