论胎儿的民法地位及其保护机理——兼析《民法典》第16条解释论之基础  

The Status of Fetus in Civil Law and the Mechanism of Protection:A Case of Article 16 of Civil Code

作　　者：郑晓剑[1] ZHENG Xiao-jian

机构地区：[1]厦门大学法学院,厦门361005

出　　处：《吉林大学社会科学学报》2023年第4期22-36,238,共16页Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(21AFX016)。

摘　　要：我国立法机关顺应学界呼声,参考比较法经验,在《民法典》第16条中对胎儿利益保护作出了一般性规定。围绕该条展开妥当的教义学体系建构的前提和关键,在于阐明胎儿的民法地位及其保护机理。通过历史考察和比较分析可以发现,传统民法虽然针对胎儿作出了一定的特殊保护,但其所维护的并非胎儿自身的利益,实质上是为未来的民事主体所采取的预先保护措施,胎儿自身并不具有民事权益的归属资格。这是因为,一方面,民法只调整生活于现世社会中的自然人之间的人际关系,故而作为一个“潜在的人”,胎儿并不具有权利能力和权利主体资格;另一方面,胎儿自身并不享有独立的、应受民法保护之利益,故而讨论胎儿的权利能力并无意义和必要。The legislature made general provisions on the protection of fetal interests in Article 16 of Civil Code in accordance with the appeal of the academic community based on the experience of comparative law.The precondition and key to the construction of a specific doctrinal system around this article is to clarify the status of fetus in civil law and the mechanism of protection.With the historical investigation and comparative analysis,it has been found that what it protects is not the fetus's own interests though the traditional civil law provides certain special protection to the fetus.In essence,it is pre-protection measures taken for future civil subjects.The fetus itself does not have the qualification of legal interests or rights because civil law only adjusts the interpersonal relationship between natural persons living in the present society.As a"potential person",the fetus does not have capacity for right and qualifications of subject.The assertion that the fetus has capacity for rights or partial capacity for right advocated by some scholars will undermine the function and value of the system of capacity for right,challenge the internal logic mechanism of civil law,and increase more difficulties in understanding and application of Civil Law.Therefore,it is hard to deem it appropriate.

关 键 词：胎儿 权利能力 权利主体 《民法典》第16条 

分 类 号：D923[政治法律—民商法学]