信息不对称下第三方电商平台质量监管机制——基于双边市场理论  

Research on Quality Supervision Mechanism of Third-Party E-Commerce Platform in Information Asymmetry Based on Two-Sided Markets Theory

作　　者：李建红 罗晓萌 史伟扬 LI Jianhong;LUO Xiaomeng;SHI Weiyang(School of Management,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China;Institute of Western China Economic Research,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074 [2]西南财经大学中国西部经济研究院,成都611130

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2023年第4期853-864,共12页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72101210)。

摘　　要：基于双边市场理论,结合电商平台第三方卖家售假行为的现状,考虑“消费者麻木”和网络外部性因素,通过构建博弈模型研究了信息不对称下电商平台单周期和多周期下质量监管策略,并就模型结论进行了数值仿真。研究发现:在单周期情形下,第三方电商平台的监管积极性受到市场中麻木消费者的比例以及自身监管成本系数的双重制约;在多周期情形下,随着博弈次数的增加,第三方电商平台和商家存在3个演化稳定策略集合,即(不监管,欺诈经营)、(不监管,诚信经营)和(监管,欺诈经营)。通过上述研究为电商平台的质量监管策略提供决策支持。Based on the two-sided markets theory and the fact that some third-party sellers sell counterfeit goods on e-commerce platforms in China,this paper investigates the quality supervision strategy of e-commerce platforms in single-circle and multi-circle cases in information asymmetry.It proposes a game-theoretic model considering factors such as“consumer numbness”and network externalities,and conducts a numerical simulation.The results show that in the single-cycle case,the intention of the platform to conduct quality supervision is affected by the proportion of numb consumers in the market and its own regulatory cost coefficient.While in the multi-cycle case,with the increase of the number of games,there are three sets of evolutionary stable strategies for e-commerce platforms and third-party sellers,i.e.,((no supervision,deceptive operation),(no supervision,honest operation)and(supervision,deceptive operation)).This paper provides decision support for the quality supervision strategy of e-commerce platforms.

关 键 词：信息不对称 双边平台 质量监管 消费者麻木 博弈论 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]