A Stackelberg game model with tax for regional air pollution control  

作　　者：Ran Jiang Laijun Zhao Lei Guo Qin Wang Yujing Xie Jian Xue 

机构地区：[1]Antai College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai,People’s Republic of China [2]Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai,People’s Republic of China [3]School of Business,East China University of Science and Technology,Shanghai,People’s Republic of China [4]College of Transport and Communications,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai,People’s Republic of China [5]China Institute of Regulation Research,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou,People’s Republic of China [6]School of Economics and Management,Shaanxi University of Science and Technology,Xi’an,People’s Republic of China

出　　处：《Journal of Management Analytics》2023年第1期1-21,共21页管理分析学报（英文）

基　　金：supported by grants from the National Natural Science Foundation of China[grant numbers 71874108,71373155,72131007];the National Social Science Fund of China[grant numbers 18AZD005,16ZDA048];the Chinese Ministry of Education on the key projects of philosophy and social sciences[grant number 17JZD025];the Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai[grant number 22ZR1415900].

摘　　要：The command-and-control regulation is likely inefficient and costly.This study investigates a regional pollution control scheme with tax(RPCST)under which the central government sets the tax rate under a given pollutant reduction quota and local governments determine their pollution removal rates based on the central government’s policy.First,a one-leader-multi-follower(OLMF)Stackelberg game model is formulated,in which the central government is the leader and the local governments are the followers.Then,a procedure based on bilevel programming and relaxation method is applied to solve the OLMF model.Finally,a case study analyzing the SO2 reduction of the Yangtze River Delta in China is conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the RPCST.The results show that RPCST works better than the current command-andcontrol scheme.Our analysis provides a guideline for governments to design optimal tax schemes to effectively solve the regional air pollution crisis.

关 键 词：Regional air pollution control One-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game Bilevel program Mathematical program with equilibrium constraints 

分 类 号：X51[环境科学与工程—环境工程]