初钊鹏等:企业环境污染第三方治理研究空·187·企业环境污染第三方治理研究——以燃煤电厂为例  

A Study on Third-Party Governance in Enterprise Environmental Pollution:A Case Study of Coal-Fired Power Plants

作　　者：初钊鹏 张晓杰 张慧 王晗 CHU Zhaopeng;ZHANG Xiaojie;ZHANG Hui;WANG Han(School of Humanities and Law,Northeastern University,Shenyang Liaoning 110167,China;School of Economics,Northeastern University at Qinhuangdao,Qinhuangdao Hebei 066099,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学文法学院,辽宁沈阳110167 [2]东北大学秦皇岛分校经济学院,河北秦皇岛066099

出　　处：《生态经济》2023年第8期187-194,218,共9页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“空间正义视域下京津冀协同发展的城市群治理研究”(17BJY054)。

摘　　要：环境污染第三方治理模式以市场化、专业化和产业化为导向,集中各方优势助力环境治理。而在第三方治理的实际推进中,存在污染企业骗补和第三方企业治理不严等问题。鉴于此,以燃煤电厂为研究对象,基于演化博弈理论分析了燃煤电厂、第三方企业和政府的污染治理问题,讨论了不同情景下各主体的行为策略选择。经研究发现,政府监管强度、补贴标准、罚款力度和环境税征收额度等环境规制政策的引导与激励对环境污染第三方治理模式的推广有重要意义。提高政府监管强度可以强化罚款政策效率,促进第三方企业严格治理;专项补贴和监管强度的配合增强了政府监管下专项补贴制度的弹性,监管强度、环境税、专项补贴的策略组合比单一政策的实施更有效。The pattern of environmental pollution control by a third party is guided by marketization,specialization and industrialization,and concentrates the advantages of all parties to help environmental governance.In the actual promotion of third-party governance,there are some problems,such as fraudulent compensation by polluting enterprises and lax pollution governance by third-party enterprises.So,this paper takes coal-fired power plants as the research object,analyzes the pollution control problems of coal-fired power plants,third-party enterprises and the government based on evolutionary game theory,and discusses the behavior strategy choice of each subject under different scenarios.It is found that the guidance and incentive of environmental regulation policies such as government supervision intensity,subsidy standard,fine intensity and environmental tax collection amount are of great significance to the promotion of the third-party governance model of environmental pollution.Improving the intensity of government supervision can strengthen the efficiency of fine policy and promote the strict governance of third-party enterprises;The combination of special subsidies and regulatory intensity enhances the flexibility of the special subsidy system under government supervision.The strategic combination of regulatory intensity,environmental tax and special subsidies is more effective than the implementation of a single policy.

关 键 词：第三方治理 燃煤电厂 演化博弈 数值仿真 

分 类 号：F426.61[经济管理—产业经济] X324[环境科学与工程—环境工程]