跨界流域生态环境脆弱性及协同治理策略研究  

Ecological environment vulnerability and collaborative governance strategy of cross-border watershed

作　　者：王俊杰 何寿奎 梁功雯 WANG Junjie;HE Shoukui;LIANG Gongwen(Powerchina Eco-environment Group Co.,Ltd.,Shenzhen 518100,China;School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China;Chongqing Urban Comprehensive Transportation Hub(Group)Co.,Ltd.,Chongqing 401121,China)

机构地区：[1]中电建生态环境集团有限公司,广东深圳518100 [2]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074 [3]重庆城市综合交通枢纽(集团)有限公司,重庆401121

出　　处：《人民长江》2023年第7期22-31,共10页Yangtze River

基　　金：重庆社会科学规划项目成渝双城经济圈建设重大项目“长江上游‘三水’协同治理的成渝联动机制研究”(2021DZSC06);国家社会科学基金年度项目“农村环境治理多元主体行为逻辑与政策引导机制研究”(18BJY094)。

摘　　要：针对跨界流域生态环境协同治理面临的横向治理评估体系不完善、治理主体主动施策意愿低的问题,从流域生态环境脆弱性改善、生态价值实现角度探索治理主体协同决策的动力机制。分别构建Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈以及协同合作博弈模型,分析流域上下游政府的生态环境协同治理策略,并建立基于流域生态环境脆弱性变化的横向生态补偿机制。研究发现:在非协同合作下,上下游政府努力程度不足;协同合作在经济层面上比非协同合作更加有利于生态环境改善;上下游政府自发达成协同合作比较困难,通过横向生态补偿机制能够有效促进上下游达成合作并能提高跨界流域生态环境合作治理效益。研究成果可为跨界流域府际合作机制的构建及横向生态补偿政策的制定提供参考。Collaborative governance of ecological environment in cross-border watersheds still faces the problems of incomplete horizontal governance evaluation system and low willingness of governance entities to actively implement policies.The dynamic mechanism of collaborative decision-making among governance entities can be explored from the perspective of improving the vulnerability of the ecological environment in watersheds and realizing ecological value.We constructed the Nash non-cooperative game,Stackelberg master-slave game,and collaborative cooperative game models to analyze the ecological environment collaborative governance strategies of upstream and downstream governments in the watershed,and established a horizontal ecological compensation mechanism based on changes in the vulnerability of the watershed ecological environment.Research finds that the efforts of upstream and downstream governments are insufficient under non-collaborative cooperation.Collaborative cooperation is more conducive to improving the ecological environment at the economic level than non-collaborative cooperation.It is difficult for upstream and downstream governments to spontaneously achieve collaborative cooperation.Through a horizontal ecological compensation mechanism,it can effectively promote cooperation between upstream and downstream and improve the efficiency of cross-border watershed ecological environment cooperation and governance.The research results can provide references for the construction of intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms in cross-border river basins and the formulation of horizontal ecological compensation policies.

关 键 词：跨界流域 生态环境脆弱性 横向生态补偿 协同治理 决策行为博弈 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学] X32[环境科学与工程—环境工程]