西江流域两广开发利用的博弈策略及其仿真  

The game strategy and simulation of the development and utilization of the Xijiang River Basin

作　　者：张左敏暘 冯鲍 凌静 ZHANG Zuominyang;FENG Bao;LING Jing(Economics School,Guangxi University,Nanning 530004,China;Graduate School,Guangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanning 530003,China;Agricultural Development Bank of China,Nanning 530027,China)

机构地区：[1]广西大学经济学院,广西南宁530004 [2]广西财经学院研究生院,广西南宁530003 [3]中国农业发展银行南宁分行,广西南宁530028

出　　处：《水利经济》2023年第4期22-29,103,共9页Journal of Economics of Water Resources

基　　金：广西科技发展战略研究专项课题项目(2020ZL00045);广西研究生教育创新计划项目(YCBZ2022033)。

摘　　要：针对西江流域开发过程中出现的水源林面积减少、水土流失严重、移民安置、水体污染严重等由经济发展带来的负面生态文明问题,采用演化博弈方法探究西江流域两大治理主体广西政府与广东政府的策略与可能产生的改变与均衡。结果表明,传统情况下两广政府博弈系统将朝着(过度开发,不合理加速)的帕累托最劣稳定状态演化,不利于西江流域生态的绿色可持续发展;引入问责机制对广西政府“过度开发”和广东政府“不合理加速”进行惩罚,博弈系统存在9种演化情景,当且仅当满足特定条件时,系统会收敛到(适度开发,合理加速)的帕累托最优状态;数值仿真模拟下根据惩罚值高低设计9种不同情景,分析惩罚值对博弈结果的影响,发现在中央政府及上级相关部门给予两广政府的问责惩罚都较高时,博弈系统朝着帕累托最优状态演化;为促进西江流域生态经济与治理的均衡发展,在问责机制设计上,要给予两广政府满足相应条件的较高惩罚值。In view of the negative ecological civilization problems brought about by economic development,such as the reduction of water source forest area,serious soil erosion,resettlement,and serious water pollution during the development of the Xijiang River Basin,this paper uses the evolutionary game method to explore the strategy and equilibrium of governance of the Xijiang River Basin between the Guangxi government and the Guangdong government.The research results show that under traditional circumstances,the game system of the two governments will evolve towards an inferior stable state(over-exploitation,unreasonable acceleration),which is not conducive to the green and sustainable development of the ecology of the Xijiang River Basin;There are 9 evolutionary scenarios in the game system when punished by“development”and“unreasonable acceleration”by the Guangdong government.If and only when specific conditions are met,the system will converge to the Pareto optimal state of(moderate development,reasonable acceleration);According to the penalty value,9 different scenarios are designed to analyze the game results of the penalty value pair.Numerical simulations show that when the central government and the higher-level relevant departments give higher accountability and punishment to the two governments,the game system will move towards the Pareto optimal state;Therefore,in order to promote the balanced development of eco-economic development and governance in the Xijiang River Basin,in the design of the accountability mechanism,it is necessary to give the two governments a higher penalty value that meets the corresponding conditions.

关 键 词：西江流域 生态治理 演化博弈 数值仿真 问责机制 广东 广西 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程]