Tax Incentives and Maturity Mismatch between Investment and Financing:Evidence from China  

作　　者：Qianbin Feng Lexin Zhao Mingxue Xu 

机构地区：[1]School of Economics,Zhejiang University,China [2]School of Economics,Institute for Fiscal Big-Data and Policy of Zhejiang University,Zhejiang University,China

出　　处：《China & World Economy》2023年第4期1-36,共36页中国与世界经济（英文版）

基　　金：supported financially by the National Natural Science Foundation of China for financial support (Nos.101302-N11502 and 72002175);the China Scholarship Council (No.202206320139)。

摘　　要：This paper examines the effects of China's accelerated depreciation policy(ADP)on the maturity mismatch between investment and financing.Using panel data for China's A-share nonfinancial listed companies from 2010 to 2019 and a staggered difference-in-differences approach,we found the following.First,ADP significantly aggravated the degree of corporate maturity mismatch,and this result was robust across multiple checks.Second,due to an insufficient long-term loan supply,firms had to finance the fixed investments induced by ADP with short-term debts,leading to maturity mismatches.Third,the positive policy effects were mainly significant for firms with high policy exposure,high-risk preferences,a high degree of information asymmetry,and firms with weak long-term financing capacity.Finally,maturity mismatch exacerbated corporate financial risks.Our research findings indicate that passive maturity mismatch is prevalent among Chinese companies and emphasize the need to address financial repression in order to mitigate the potential financial risks that may arise from tax incentives.

关 键 词：accelerated depreciation financial repression maturity mismatch tax incentives 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学] F83