The Geographical Rotation of Local Officials and Enterprise Cross-city Mergers and Acquisitions in China  

作　　者：Liangxiong Huang Peilun Li Xianbin Wang Caiting Yang 

机构地区：[1]School of Economics and Finance,South China University of Technology,China [2]School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,China [3]College of Economics,Jinan University,China [4]School of Management,Lanzhou University,China

出　　处：《China & World Economy》2023年第4期66-89,共24页中国与世界经济（英文版）

基　　金：supported financially by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos.72073047 and 72273052);the Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province (No.2021A1515011983);the Guangzhou Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project (No.2021GZYB01).

摘　　要：The economic impact of the geographical rotation of local officials is important in China's official management system.This study used a zero-inflated Poisson regression model and found that the geographical rotation of local officials significantly increased cross-city mergers and acquisitions(M&As)of enterprises.The impact of local officials'geographical rotation on M&As was more pronounced under certain conditions.These conditions included:(i)when officials were transferred from cities with a higher development level to cities with a lower development level;(ii)when the outflow cities were municipalities directly governed by the central government,provincial capitals,or separately listed cities;(iii)when the transfers of officials occurred within the same province;(iv)when the transfers took place before 2012;and(v)when the transfers happened in the years following significant central government conferences,which provided strong political incentives for M&As.

关 键 词：geographical rotation of local officials M&As Poisson model 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学] F27[政治法律—中外政治制度]