外商企业在华并购的目标:“樱桃”还是“柠檬”?  被引量:1

Who is the Target of Foreign M&A in China:Cherry or Lemon?

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作  者:蒋冠宏[1] 彭勇 JIANG Guanhong;PENG Yong

机构地区:[1]厦门大学经济学院 [2]东莞滨海湾新区管理委员会

出  处:《世界经济研究》2023年第7期32-46,M0002,共16页World Economy Studies

基  金:国家自然科学基金面上项目“中国企业对外直接投资的模式选择和国际化特征研究”(基金号:71973112)的资助。

摘  要:文章首先建立了一个包含可移动资源、不可移动资源和负向生产率冲击的简单理论模型进行分析,通过理论分析得到两个基本结论:第一,并购可移动资源丰富(生产率较高)和不可移动资源丰富(出口网络多)的企业为外商企业创造了更高价值;第二,并购遭受负向冲击的企业给外商企业带来的收益更高,即“趁火打劫”可以获得更高的收益。文章在理论分析的基础上,采用1999~2013年的中国工业企业进行了实证检验。实证结果表明,外商企业倾向于并购生产率较高和出口网络丰富的目标企业,具有高生产率和广泛出口网络的企业在受到生产率负向冲击时更容易成为外商企业的并购目标。文章研究发现,外商企业在华并购的目标是优质资源,特别是遭受负向冲击的优质企业更易成为并购目标。因此,文章的研究为外商企业进入中国市场选择并购目标提供了理论和经验解释。Cross-border Merges and Acquisitions is a kind of form that foreign companies enter Chinese market.How do the foreign companies choose target which they want to merger.This paper uses a theory including productivity,export net and negative shock to analysis the mechanism.We find that merging domestic companies which have high productivity and many networks of export will bring large gain for foreign companies.While we also find that merging the Chinese firms which suffer negative shock will create bigger market value.This imply the fire sale FDI existing in China.According to the theory analysis,we use the data of Chinese firms to find the empirical evidence.We find that firms which have high productivity and many networks of export are merged by foreign companies in high probability.Foreign companies also prefer the domestic firms which have suffered negative shock.Furthermore,we find that domestic firms which suffer little financial constrain have the high probability to be targets.Thus,that foreign companies prefer cherry than lemon.Our paper contributes to understand the mechanism of how foreign companies choose the domestic targets.

关 键 词:外商直接投资 全要素生产率 出口网络 融资约束 

分 类 号:F832.6[经济管理—金融学] F271F425

 

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