代理风险与权力配置——中国古代防范官员滥用职权的关系学原理  

Agency Risk and Power Allocation--Relationship Theory in the Prevention of officials from Abusing Their Power in Ancient China

作　　者：吕福龙 LYU Fu-long(College of Public Administration,Shanxi Agriculural Universiy,Jinzhong Shanxi 030800,China)

机构地区：[1]山西农业大学公共管理学院,山西晋中030800

出　　处：《太原理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第4期25-33,共9页Journal of Taiyuan University of Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：山西农业大学博士科研启动哲学社会科学项目“中国法律史研究”(2020ZBQ02)。

摘　　要：由于圈子关系是官员滥用职权的前置条件,因此如何防范因关系的嵌入导致的代理风险,成为了古代政府组织防范官员滥用职权更为深层的难题所在。为了解决这一问题,明初政府尝试以巧妙的权力配置来限制嵌入性代理风险的激化。具体而言,朱元璋加强了集权与专制的程度,分化了中层官员及地方大员的权力,悬隔了县级官员与民间社会的关联,使得高层官僚圈子、中层官僚圈子与基层官僚圈子都得到了削弱,从而有效限制了嵌入性代理风险的激化。文章为分析我国传统政治制度的演变提供了一种不同的解释,同时也为我国古代政治制度的研究提供了一种新的视野。With circle relationship as the precondition for officials to abuse their power,the prevention of agency risk caused by embedded relationship became a deeper problem for ancient government organizations to prevent officials from abusing their power.In order to solve this problem,the early Ming government tried to limit the intensification of embedded agency risks with clever power allocation.Specifically,Zhu Yuanzhang strengthened the degree of centralization and autocracy,divided the power of middle-level officials and local officials,and isolated the relationship between county-level officials and civil society,thus weakening the circles among high-level,middle-level,and grass-roots bureaucrats respectively,and effectively limiting the intensification of embedded agency risks.This paper provides a different explanation for analyzing the evolution of traditional Chinese political system,as well as a new perspective for the study on Chinese ancient political system.

关 键 词：代理风险 权力配置 滥用职权 关系学 

分 类 号：D69[政治法律—政治学]