社交媒体平台的市场势力:从何而来,往何处去  

Social media platforms' market power:Origin and evolution

作　　者：端利涛 李思瑞 彭赓 吕本富 Litao Duan;Sirui Li;Geng Peng;Benfu LV(Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences;ECARES,UniversitéLibre de Bruxelles;School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences;China Institute for Innovation&Development Strategy,Chinese Academy of Sciences)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所 [2]中国社会科学院信息化研究中心 [3]中国社会科学院中国经济社会发展与智能治理实验室 [4]比利时布鲁塞尔自由大学欧洲经济学与统计学高级研究中心 [5]中国科学院大学经济与管理学院 [6]中国国家创新与发展战略研究会

出　　处：《产业经济评论》2023年第4期185-200,共16页Review of Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“健全互联网领导和管理体制研究”(项目编号:22ZDA078)。

摘　　要：社交媒体平台是数字经济运行中的重要参与主体,对社会生活发挥着深刻的影响。然而,已有研究尚缺乏有针对性的、关于社交媒体平台市场势力形成机制的探讨。本文基于双边市场的基本原理,建立符合实际的模型并刻画了社交媒体平台面向的内容消费者、非营利性内容发布者和营利性内容发布者三种用户角色之间的均衡定价策略及平台的市场势力;以此为基础,结合现实案例分析了横向并购和分拆对社交媒体平台市场势力的比较静态效应。基准模型的分析结果显示:均衡状态下,社交媒体平台选择面向内容消费者和非营利性内容发布者收取较低费用以培育用户基数,并以此为基础向广告商、付费内容商、政治宣传主体等营利性内容发布者摄取局部垄断利润,进而获得更广泛的舆论影响力。案例分析结果显示:在特定的环境下,社交媒体平台的横向并购可能会不可逆地扩大收购方平台的内容消费者规模并使其获得更高的均衡利润;横向并购后的分拆虽然无法使平台的市场势力回到并购前的状态,但可以使其不再继续扩张。Social media platforms are important participants in the operation of digital economy and play a profound impact on social life.However,the existing research still lacks targeted discussion on the formation mechanism of market power of social media platforms.Based on the basic principle of two-sided market,this paper establishes a realistic model and describes the equilibrium pricing strategy of social media platform for content consumers,non-profit content publishers and for-profit content publishers,and the market power of the platform.Based on this,this paper analyzes the comparative static effects of horizontal merger and spin-off on the market power of social media platforms in combination with real cases.The analysis results of the benchmark model show that:in equilibrium,social media platforms choose to charge low fees to content consumers and non-profit content publishers to cultivate user base,and on this basis,take partial monopoly profits from for-profit content publishers such as advertisers,paid content providers and political propaganda subjects,and then obtain wider public opinion influence.The results of the case study show that under certain circumstances,horizontal MA of social media platforms may irreversibly increase the scale of content consumers of the acquirer platform and make it obtain higher equilibrium profits.Although the spin-off after horizontal merger and acquisition cannot return the market power of the platform to the state before merger and acquisition,it can stop the expansion of the platform.

关 键 词：社交媒体 双边市场 市场势力 平台垄断 数字经济 

分 类 号：G206[文化科学—传播学]