具有竞争性的品牌方与主播的Stackelberg博弈模型  

Stackelberg game model between competitive brands and anchor

作　　者：陆媛媛[1] 陶佳怡 LU Yuan-yuan;TAO Jia-yi(College of Mathematics and Computer Science,Jilin Normal University,Siping 136000,China)

机构地区：[1]吉林师范大学数学与计算机学院,吉林四平136000

出　　处：《吉林师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2023年第3期61-67,共7页Journal of Jilin Normal University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71501082)。

摘　　要：随着直播行业不断发展与进步,直播带货逐渐成为时代新主流,越来越多的品牌方开始关注直播销售这一渠道,竞争也随之越演越烈.基于这一现状,结合博弈论相关理论,构建由多个品牌方(以两个为例)与一个主播组成的Stackelberg博弈模型,从实际出发,将竞争要素引入模型中,讨论了上游具有竞争性的品牌方的最优产品定价以及下游主播直播带货时的最优努力水平问题,预估了各博弈方的最大利润,分析了各因素对最优决策、最大利润的影响,为品牌方及主播的科学运营提供理论与实践指导.With the continuous development and progress of live broadcasting industry,live broadcasting with goods has gradually become the new mainstream of the times.More and more brands begin to pay attention to the channel of live broadcasting sales,and the competition is becoming more and more fierce.Based on this situation,combined with the theory of game theory,a Stackelberg game model composed of multiple brands(taking two as an example)and an anchor can be constructed.From the actual point of view,introduced the competitive factors into the model,discussed the optimal product pricing of the upstream competitive brands and the optimal effort level of the downstream anchor,and estimated the maximum profit of each game party.Analyzed the influence of various factors on the optimal decision and the maximum profit,which provided theoretical and practical guidance for the scientific operation of the brands and the anchors.

关 键 词：直播带货 竞争强度 品牌方 主播 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]