招投标市场中企业诚信招标行为的演化博弈模型及策略分析  

Evolutionary Game Model and Strategy Analysis of Enterprises’Honest Bidding Behavior in Bidding Market

作　　者：曾维圣 郭志明 胡旭 罗丹 ZENG Weisheng;GUO Zhiming;HU Xu;LUO Dan(School of Civil Engineering and Architecture,Wuhan Institute of Technology,Wuhan 430074,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉工程大学土木工程与建筑学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《建筑经济》2023年第S01期472-478,共7页Construction Economy

摘　　要：招投标市场中的“围标”“合谋”等违法行为严重破坏了招投标市场的公平公正。针对以上问题,本文结合博弈理论相关知识以及群体演化的思想,从招标企业的决策动机出发,建立招投标市场企业诚信招标的对称演化博弈模型。仿真实验结果显示,招标企业的项目收益、政府的监管程度、惩罚及激励制度等均对招标企业的决策有重大影响,政府可以从减少招标企业的收益出发,采取合适的措施和政策促使更多的招标企业选择诚信招标策略,并且随着群体决策的演化,采取合谋策略的招标企业将会越来越少,选择诚信经营和诚信招标的企业最终将占领招投标市场。The illegal activities such as“bidding encirclement”and“collusion”in the bidding market seriously undermine the fairness and impartiality of the bidding market.In view of the above problems,this paper combines the relevant knowledge of game theory and the idea of group evolution,and from the decision-making motivation of bidding enterprises,establishes a symmetric evolutionary game model of enterprise integrity bidding in the bidding market.The results of simulation experiments show that the indexes such as the income of bidding enterprises,government monitoring,punishment and incentives have a significant impact on the decision-making of bidding enterprises.Starting from reducing the income of bidding enterprises,the government can adopt appropriate measures and policies to encourage more bidding enterprises to choose honest bidding strategies.With the evolution of group decision-making,fewer bidding enterprises will adopt collusive strategies,enterprises that choose honest management and honest bidding will eventually occupy the bidding market.

关 键 词：招投标市场 合谋 群体演化 决策动机 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济] F251