基于演化博弈的国际贸易融资风险防范  

Research on Risk Prevention of International Trade Financing Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：李青 李岩 Li Qing;Li Yan(Woosuk University,Republic of Korea,Jeonju 55338;Zhongjing Technology Group Co.,Ltd.,Shijiazhuang 050000)

机构地区：[1]韩国又石大学,韩国全州55338 [2]中憬科技集团有限公司,河北石家庄050000

出　　处：《中阿科技论坛（中英文）》2023年第8期48-51,61,共5页China-Arab States Science and Technology Forum

摘　　要：国际贸易融资是进出口交易中重要的资金融通方式,不仅可以帮助企业获得资金以满足订单需求,降低交易风险,增加企业的出口竞争力,同时还能助力扩大融资银行规模,提高银行收益水平,但国际贸易融资存在诸多风险。文章以演化博弈理论为基础,通过建立外贸企业和融资银行的博弈模型,并对其合作和竞争的演化博弈策略以及相关策略对双方利益和风险的影响进行了分析,针对分析结果提出了若干帮助融资企业和银行应对贸易融资风险的具体建议。International trade financing is a vital means of capital financing in import and export transactions,which can not only help enterprises obtain funds to meet order demands,reduce transaction risks and enhance their export competitiveness,but also help expand the scale of financing banks and improve their profitability.However,international trade financing faces various risks.According to evolutionary game theory,the thesis establishes a game model between foreign trade enterprises and financing banks,and examines the evolutionary game strategies of cooperation and competition,as well as the impact of relevant strategies on the interests and risks of both parties.In the end,several suggestions are proposed to help enterprises and banks cope with the risks in trade financing.

关 键 词：演化博弈 系统动力学 贸易融资 风险防范 

分 类 号：F740[经济管理—国际贸易]