平台销售模式下制造商渠道设计与协调策略  

Channel Design and Coordination Strategy of the Manufacturer under Platform Selling

作　　者：张梦颖[1] 张子豪 汪宁宁 吴海辉[1] ZHANG Mengying;ZHANG Zihao;WANG Ningning;WU Haihui(School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei 230061,China;School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥230061 [2]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第7期23-29,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：安徽省自然科学基金资助项目(2108085QG295,2008085QG338);国家自然科学基金资助项目(72001002)。

摘　　要：考虑了拥有传统零售渠道的制造商是否应该新增平台销售渠道,并将平台渠道带来的市场拓展、渠道竞争以及佣金费率引入供应链决策模型,通过构建增加平台渠道前后的供应链决策模型,分析制造商的渠道设计策略及其对传统零售商利润的影响。随后,针对新增平台渠道导致的渠道冲突,设计带固定补偿的批发零售价格契约对供应链进行协调。研究表明:新增平台渠道可能会伤害制造商和传统零售商的利润,或者伤害其中一方利润,或者增加双方利润,这取决于平台渠道带来的潜在市场大小;当偏好传统渠道的消费者比例低于(高于)某个阈值时,制造商通过双渠道(传统渠道)进行产品销售;批发零售价格契约可以实现供应链的协调,但仅在特定情形下可以同时改善制造商和传统零售商的利润;在批发零售价格契约的基础上设计固定补偿值,可以实现制造商和传统零售商利润的帕累托改进,固定补偿值的范围受消费者渠道偏好的影响。In recent years,online retail has experienced strong growth,and many manufacturers have chosen to join online retail platforms by paying commissions to obtain the qualifications to sell their products on these platforms.By opening up e-commerce platforms as a sales channel,manufacturers can expand their sales reach,reduce sales costs,and avoid being dominated by traditional retailers.However,joining a platform sales channel not only requires paying a certain commission to the platform but also can lead to serious channel conflicts and competition for manufacturers due to the coexistence of multiple sales channels.Failure to effectively resolve conflicts between the two channels will damage the profits of the members of the supply chain.Therefore,whether to add a platform sales channel in the presence of traditional retail channels and how to deal with the competition and conflicts caused by the increase in channels are issues of concern to manufacturers.In this paper,we consider whether a manufacturer with a traditional retail channel should add the platform channel,and take market expansion,channel competition,and platform fee rate brought by platform selling into supply chain decision-making models.We construct a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the traditional retailer,where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower.By constructing supply chain decision-making models with and without the platform channel,we analyze the manufacturer’s channel design strategy and its effect on the traditional retailer’s profit.Further,a wholesale-retail price contract with fixed compensation is designed to coordinate the supply chain for channel conflicts caused by channel addition.This paper derives several main conclusions.First,due to the existence of channel competition,when the potential market increment brought by the platform is limited,adding new platform channels will hurt the profits of both manufacturers and retailers.As the increment increases,adding new platform channels will b

关 键 词：平台 渠道设计 批发零售价格契约 固定补偿 

分 类 号：F722.2[经济管理—产业经济]