基于微分博弈的政府企业污染控制与最优环境政策分析  

Analysis of Government and Enterprise Pollution Control and Optimal Environmental Policy Based on Differential Game

作　　者：徐浩 谭德庆[2] XU Hao;TAN Deqing(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Petroleum University,Chengdu 610500,China;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南石油大学经济管理学院,四川成都610500 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第7期107-112,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(22YJC630171);四川石油天然气发展研究中心年度课题(SKB21-01);四川省自然科学基金青年项目(2023NSFSC1055);四川省哲学社会科学生态文明建设专项(SC22ST13);成都市哲学社会科学规划项目(2022BS113)。

摘　　要：在考虑污染容量动态变化基础上,建立了政府与企业间环境政策选择的微分博弈模型,得到排放标准、排污税、排污权交易以及排污税与减排补贴混合政策四种情形下反馈纳什均衡并进行对比分析。结论表明,若企业间减排成本相同,排放标准、排污税与排污权交易具有等价性,且环境效益优于混合政策,仅当环境受到的伤害小于一定值时,混合政策下的社会福利才优于其他政策;当企业间减排成本不同时,排污税与排污权交易同样等价,排放标准下的环境效益低于排污税和排污权交易,混合政策下的环境效益最低。最后,通过数值仿真分析了污染容量与社会福利的动态轨迹,为政府有效治理污染提供了科学依据。Environmental pollution originates from the excessive discharge of pollutants by industrial firms.However,due to the pollutant attributes of externality and public goods,firms are reluctant to reduce their emissions or invest in emission abatement activities,resulting in market failure.Therefore,governments have adopted command-and-control or market-based environmental policies,such as emission standards,taxes,permit trading,etc.,to govern the environment.China’s current environmental pollution management policies for enterprises are based on command-and-control pollution emission standards and pilot emissions trading systems in some domestic cities.At the same time,the official implementation of the Environmental Protection Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China in 2018 marked a shift from administrative command-based to various policies combining administrative and market-based policies.For this reason,how the government selects a reasonable environmental policy for the specific situation in its region is an urgent problem to be solved.In this context,this paper takes the government as the core perspective and selects four scenarios of emission standards,emission taxes,emissions trading,and mixed policies of emission reduction subsidies,and establishes a Stackelberg differential game model between the government and enterprises in which the enterprises take profit maximization as the decision objective.The government takes social welfare maximization as the decision objective under the dynamic change of regional environmental pollution capacity.The Nash equilibrium solutions are compared and analyzed,and finally,numerical analysis is performed,and relevant management strategies are given according to the results.The results of the study find that:If the cost of emission reduction is the same among enterprises,emission standards,and emission taxes,and emissions trading are equivalent,the environmental benefits are better than those of the mixed policy,and social welfare under the mixed policy is better th

关 键 词：污染容量 排放标准 排污税 排污权交易 混合政策 微分博弈 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]