共同机构所有权对管理层年报语调操纵的影响研究  

Research on the Effect of Common Institutional Ownership on Tone Manipulation of Management’s Annual Report

作　　者：刘锦英[1] 徐海伟 LIU Jinying;XU Haiwei(Henan University,Kaifeng,Henan,China;Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan,China)

机构地区：[1]河南大学管理科学与工程研究所 [2]华中科技大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2023年第8期1245-1253,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助重点项目(21AGL007)。

摘　　要：以2007~2020年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证考察共同机构所有权对管理层年报语调操纵行为的影响。研究发现,共同机构所有权对管理层年报语调操纵行为具有显著的抑制作用。作用机制检验表明,共同机构所有权能够通过降低代理成本、提高公司信息透明度,以及委派董事来影响管理层年报语调操纵行为,其中公司信息透明度的中介效应占主导。异质性分析表明,在国有企业以及行业竞争程度较高的情境下,共同机构所有权对管理层年报语调操纵行为的抑制作用更加明显。This study takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as the research samples,and empirically investigates the influence of common institutional ownership on the tone manipulation of management’s annual report.It is found that the ownership of common institutions has a significant inhibitory effect on the intonation manipulation of management’s annual report.The mechanism test shows that the common institution ownership can restrain the tone manipulation of management’s annual report by reducing agency costs,improving the transparency of company information and appointing directors.Among them,the intermediary effect of improving the transparency of corporate information is dominant.The heterogeneity analysis shows that under the situation of high industry competition and state-owned enterprises existing,the ownership of common institutions has a more obvious inhibitory effect on the tone manipulation of management’s annual report.

关 键 词：共同机构所有权 年报语调操纵 公司治理 代理成本 公司信息透明度 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]