深度调峰市场中火电机组报价的博弈研究  

Game Study of Thermal Power Unit Quotation in Deep Peak Regulation Market

作　　者：徐斌 熊威 邱凯 刘敦楠[2] 梁家豪 XU Bin;XIONG Wei;QIU Kai;LIU Dunnan

机构地区：[1]五凌电力有限公司 [2]华北电力大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《价格理论与实践》2023年第2期88-92,202,共6页Price:Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目:面向国家能源安全的智慧能源创新模式与政策协同机制研究(19ZDA081);五凌电力有限公司项目:五凌电力辅助服务市场参与策略研究(320115FW0420200028)。

摘　　要：火电机组参与深调辅助服务交易的报价决策,关系整个深度调峰辅助服务市场的平稳运行。本文基于博弈论思想对火电机组参与深调辅助服务市场报价决策进行研究,首先,对现行的深度调峰辅助市场运行机制进行分析;其次,采用虚拟对手的分析方法将复杂的多方博弈问题虚拟转化为双方博弈问题;最后,基于某省调峰辅助服务市场运行数据进行算例分析,对上述博弈均衡状态及其均衡解进行分析,得到在不完全信息静态博弈均衡状态下机组参与深度调峰辅助服务交易的最佳机组出力区间和相应区间内最佳机组深调服务报价,验证了本文博弈模型及其均衡解的合理性。本文的研究对火电机组参与深度调峰市场报价决策具有一定的参考价值。The quotation decision of thermal power units participating in the deep peaking auxiliary service trading has a significant impact on the smooth operation of the entire deep peaking auxiliary service market.Based on game theory,this paper investigates the offer decision of thermal power units participating in deep peaking auxiliary service market.Firstly,the paper analyzes the current operation mechanism of the deep peaking auxiliary market;Secondly,it applies the virtual adversary analysis method to transform the complex multi-party game problem into a two-party game problem;Finally,based on the operational data of the peak shaving auxiliary service market in a certain province,a case study is conducted to analyze the equilibrium state and its solution of the above game.Thus,we obtain the optimal unit output range and the optimal unit deep regulation service quotation within the corresponding range for unit participation in deep regulation auxiliary service transactions under the state of incomplete information static game equilibrium,verifying the rationality of the game model and its equilibrium solution in this paper.The research in this article has certain reference value for the participation of thermal power units in deep peak shaving market quotation decision-making.

关 键 词：深度调峰市场 报价决策 博弈论 均衡分析 

分 类 号：TM621[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F426.61[经济管理—产业经济]