Collusion Potential Assessment in Electricity Markets Considering Generation Flexibility  

作　　者：Teng Tu Yi Ding Peng Ji Minglei Bao Nan Shang Yonghua Song Dan Zeng 

机构地区：[1]College of Electrical Engineering,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310027,China [2]Beijing Power Exchange Center Co.Ltd.,Beijing 100000,China [3]the Institute of Energy Strategy and Policy,China Southern Power Grid,Guangzhou 510663,China [4]State Key Laboratory of Internet of Things for Smart City,University of Macao,Taipa,Macao SAR,China [5]China Electric Power Research Institute,Nanjing 210037,China.

出　　处：《CSEE Journal of Power and Energy Systems》2023年第4期1551-1566,共16页中国电机工程学会电力与能源系统学报（英文）

基　　金：supported in part by the Science and Technology Project of SGCC Technical report on multi-objective global optimal allocation model and strategy research of power trading in the new era under Grant No.SGZJ0000KXJS1900181.

摘　　要：The collusion among various generating units has been a problematic issue affecting the fairness and transparency of electricity markets.Therefore,it is of great significance to assess the potential of such collusion in the electricity market.However,the previous assessment studies primarily focused on the bidding behaviors of collusive generating units,without considering the influences of generation flexibility,such as ramp rates.In this paper,a novel assessment method is proposed to evaluate the collusion potential in the electricity market considering generation flexibility.First,a bi-level optimization model is developed to simulate the collusive strategies of dif-ferent generating units,including the withholding of generation capacities and ramp rates,as well as the uplifting of minimum outputs and bidding prices.In the upper-level problem,collusive generating units optimize their offering strategies to optimize the generation profits without violating the regulatory laws.The lower-level problem is a day-ahead economic dispatch model which minimizes the dispatching costs.Based on the optimal collusive strategies determined by the bi-level model,a framework is then proposed to assess the collusion potential in electricity markets.Moreover,price-based and profit-based indices are proposed to quantitatively evaluate the collusion potential of different generating units.Finally,the proposed assessment method is validated on a modified IEEE 39-node system.The numerical results demonstrated that generation flexibility can be exploited collusively for making excessive profits,particularly during load peaks and valleys.Index Terms-Collusionpotential,economic cdispatch,generation flexibility,ramp rates,strategic withholding.

关 键 词：Collusionpotentiale conomiccdispatch generation flexibility ramp rates strategic withholding. 

分 类 号：F407.61[经济管理—产业经济] TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] TP181[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程]