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作 者:施文祥 方培杰 SHI Wen-xiang;FANG Pei-jie(Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)
出 处:《当代财经》2023年第8期57-69,共13页Contemporary Finance and Economics
基 金:国家社会科学基金项目“‘双碳’目标下我国制造业出口产品质量升级的数字化驱动研究”(22BJY226)。
摘 要:良好的制度设计是防范化解风险的关键,以往关于上市公司股价崩盘风险的研究忽视了上市公司退市制度的影响。以2020年底中国出台的上市公司强制退市新政策为准自然实验,使用2016-2022年A股非金融行业上市公司样本的实证研究表明:第一,退市新规施行后,A股退市公司数量显著增加,平均而言,公司股价崩盘风险得到抑制,净利润为负的公司抑制效果更为明显。第二,标准更严格的退市新政策对股价信息操纵空间的限制提升了股价的信息含量,是降低股价崩盘风险的重要渠道,而管理层持股也有助于抑制股价崩盘风险。第三,新政策的效果受上市公司自身差异的影响,退市新规对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用在非国有控股、位于高集中度行业、外部监管弱、内部治理水平高的企业中更为明显。上述结果意味着,畅通上市企业退出机制,有利于遏制崩盘导致的股价波动。因此,加强外部监管,优化内部治理,减少信息不对称程度,是业绩不理想的公司降低自身股价崩盘风险的重要途径。Well-designed systems are the key to preventing and resolving risks,but previous stud-ies on the share price collapse risks of the listed companies have neglected the impact of delisting mechanisms on listed companies.Taking the new policy of mandatory delisting of listed companies implemented by China in late 2020 as a quasi-natural experiment,this paperconducts an empirical study by using the samples of the A-share listed companies in the non-financial industry from 2016 to 2022.The findings show that,firstly,after the implementation of the new delisting policy,the number of the exited A share listed companies has increased significantly;on average,the risk of stock price collapse has been suppressed,which is more obvious in the companies with positive net profit.Secondly,the restriction of the new delisting policy with stricter standards on the space for the manipulation of share price information has increased the information content of the share price,which is an important channel to reduce the risks of share price collapse;while the share-holding of the management is also conductive to suppressing the risks of share price collapse.Thirdly,the effect of the new policy is affected by the differences among the listed companies,the inhibiting effect of the new delisting rule on the risks of share price collapse is more pronounced in the enterprises that are non-state-owned,that are located in the highly centralized industries,that with weak external su-pervision,and that with higher internal governance level.The above conclusions suggest that to smooth the delisting mechanism for the listed companies is conductive to restricting share price volatility resulted from the collapses.Therefore,strengthening external supervision,optimizing internal governance,reducing information asymmetry are the important paths for the companies with non-ideal performance to reduce the risks of their stock price collapse.
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