创新信号无效还是市场激励不足——风险投资市场对科技企业资源配置低效之谜  

The Ineffective Innovation Signals or the Insufficient Incentive:The Mystery of the Low Efficiency of Venture Capital Market on the Resource Allocation of Science and Technology Enterprises

作　　者：马仁敏 张涤新[1] 葛扬[1] Ma Renmin;Zhang Dixin;Ge Yang(Institute of Economics,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210000,China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学经济学院,江苏南京210000

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2023年第16期42-51,共10页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：教育部哲学社科研究重大课题攻关项目(20JZD005)。

摘　　要：我国风险投资市场对科技企业资源配置效率偏低抑制初创企业技术创新。基于信号理论和激励理论,构建非完全信息下的动态博弈模型,求解使创新能力强的企业更倾向于发出信号并获得风险资本支持的分离均衡存在的前提条件,即创新信号的有效性和风险资本投资创新企业的激励相容性。基于2005—2020年上市科技企业数据进行实证检验,结果发现:(1)我国风险投资市场具备对科技企业的资源配置作用,但效率偏低;(2)专利申请行为作为创新信号能够有效反映企业创新能力,并可被风险资本识别;(3)风险资本投资创新企业的超额收益率偏低。风险资本对创新企业投资激励不足,导致风险投资市场无法实现分离均衡,从而降低市场资源配置效率。China's venture capital market for technology start-ups has been in a situation of insufficient effective supply owing to its late start and short development time.The risk aversion of venture capital(VC) to technology start-ups has resulted in a mismatch of resources,leading to inefficient resource allocation to technology enterprises in the VC market,and inhibiting RD investment and technological innovation in technology start-ups.In view of the long-term market failure in China's venture capital market,this paper investigates the reasons for the inefficient allocation of resources to technology start-ups in China's venture capital market based on signaling and incentive theories.By constructing a dynamic game model with imperfect information,it fulfills the preconditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium in which firms with strong innovation capabilities tend to signal and can be supported by venture capital(VC):the effectiveness of innovation signals(the distinguishability of innovation signals to firms' innovation capabilities and the identifiability of innovation signals to VCs) and the incentive compatibility of VCs to invest in innovative firms.The empirical evidence based on the data of technology enterprises listed in 2005-2020 shows that firstly the in novation performance of technology enterprises receiving VC investment in China is significantly higher than that of technology enterprises not invested by VC,but there is no significant relationship between the intensity of VC investment and the innovation performance of enterprises,indicating that China's venture capital market possesses the role of resource allocation to technology enterprises,but it is inefficient;secondly patent application behavior as an innovation signal can effectively reflect the innovation ability of enterprises and be identified by VC,indicating that the innovation signal constructed in this paper has validity;lastly the low excess return rate on VC investment returns to innovative enterprises gives VCs insufficien

关 键 词：创新信号 市场激励 激励相容 资源配置 分离均衡 风险投资 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]