动态奖惩机制下低碳电力供给侧政企演化博弈研究  

Research on the Evolutionary Game of Governments and Enterprises in Lowcarbon Power Supply Side Under the Dynamic Reward-penalty Mechanism

作　　者：武群丽[1] 林荣昊 WU Qunli;LIN Ronghao(Department of Economics and Management,North China Electric Power University,Baoding 071003,Hebei Province,China)

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学经济管理系,河北省保定市071003

出　　处：《现代电力》2023年第4期525-536,共12页Modern Electric Power

摘　　要：基于消费者行为理论和演化博弈理论,构建消费者效用函数、发电企业利润函数和碳减排作为约束的地方政府与发电企业演化博弈模型,着重分析消费者偏好、产品网络外部性、地方政府奖惩机制、监管成本及中央政府约束机制对演化稳定策略的影响,并构建固定效应模型对结论进行实证分析。结果表明:静态奖惩机制下不存在演化稳定策略,动态奖惩机制下地方政府与发电企业的演化轨迹为围绕唯一均衡策略不断螺旋推近。地方政府严格监管概率与消费者低碳偏好、不严格监管成本和中央政府约束力度呈正相关,与消费者高碳偏好、产品网络外部性、惩罚下限和严格监管成本呈负相关;惩罚下限、不严格监管成本及中央政府约束力度对促进企业低碳化生产具有正向作用,严格监管成本对发电行业碳减排具有负向作用。Based on consumer behavior theory and evolutionary game,taking consumer utility function,profit function of power generating enterprises,power generation company profit function and carbon emission reduction as constraints,a consumer utility function was constructed.The impacts of consumer's preference,the product network externality,the reward and punishment mechanism of local government,the regulatory cost and the central government restraint mechanism on evolutionary stability strategy were mainly analyzed,and a fixed-effect model was constructed to carry out empirical analysis on the conclusion.Results of the analysis showed that under static reward-penalty mechanism there was no stable strategy of evolutionary;under the dynamic reward-penalty mechanism the evolutionary trajectory of local government and power generating enterprises was constantly and spirally propelled around the unique equilibrium strategy.The probability of strict supervision of local government was positively correlated with consumer’s low-carbon preference,the cost of undemanding supervision and the constraint strength of central government were negatively correlated with consumer’s highcarbon preference,product network externality,the lower limit of the punish and the cost of strict supervision.The lower limit of punishment,the cost of undemanding supervision and the constraint strength of central government played positive role in promoting low-carbon production of enterprises,and strict regulation of cost played a negative role in carbon emission reduction of power generating enterprises.

关 键 词：动态奖惩机制 低碳电力 供给侧 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]