慈善组织运行中委托代理失灵及其矫正之策  

Principal-Agent Failure and Correction Strategies in the Operation of Charity Organizations

作　　者：尹润澔 钟裕民[2] Yin Runhao;Zhong Yumin

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,南京210008 [2]南京师范大学公共管理学院,南京210023

出　　处：《南京社会科学》2023年第6期73-80,共8页Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“我国慈善组织内部治理研究”(19BSH137)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：慈善事业涉及捐赠主体、慈善组织、受赠主体、公众、媒体、受托企业等众多利益相关者,形成了多重委托代理关系。然而在实践中,委托代理常常出现失灵现象,而这恰恰是影响慈善组织有效运行的重要问题。慈善组织运行中的委托代理失灵,集中体现为慈善资源所有者委托不足而导致的慈善组织低效运行,接受委托的公益慈善机构越权代理、表面代理、局部代理、歪曲代理。造成这种失灵现象的主要原因在于慈善组织的弱激励与弱监督并存。矫正这种失灵现象,需要慈善组织通过强激励与强监督并行的运行机制来实现。Charity involves many stakeholders such as donors,charitable organizations,recipients,the public,the media,and entrusted companies,forming multiple principal-agent relationships.However,in practice,principal-agent often fails,and this is precisely an important issue affecting the effective operation of charitable organizations.The failure of principal-agent in the operation of charity organizations is reflected by the inefficient operation of charity organizations,which is caused by insufficient entrustment by charitable resource owners.Additionally,the failure is reflected by the acceptance of cross-boundary agents,superficial agents,partial agents,and distorted agents.The main reason for this failure is the coexistence of weak incentives and weak supervision of charitable organizations,which leads to inefficient operation.Correcting this failure requires charity organizations to implement a parallel operating mechanism of strong incentives and strong supervision.

关 键 词：慈善组织 委托代理失灵 强激励 强监督 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]