废旧共享单车回收策略的四方演化博弈分析  

Four⁃party evolutionary game analysis of recycling strategies for used shared bicycles

作　　者：刘阳 张桂涛[2] 王志远 张晓春 LIU Yang;ZHANG Guitao;WANG Zhiyuan;ZHANG Xiaochun(Cultural Industry Research Institute,Qilu University of Technology,Jinan Shandong 250353,China;School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao Shandong 266071,China)

机构地区：[1]齐鲁工业大学文化产业研究院,山东济南250353 [2]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2023年第8期180-192,共13页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“供应链网络视角下促进企业绿色转型发展的碳减排政策研究”(批准号:19BGL091)。

摘　　要：作为一种新出现的商业模式,共享单车经过前几年的高速发展,目前逐渐趋于理性。由于前期的投入过多,相应的配套措施不完备,带来了一系列的社会问题,比如废旧共享单车的回收严重滞后,造成环境污染和资源浪费。为坚持绿色低碳的发展方向,有效促进共享单车的高效回收,提升环境效益,该研究根据共享单车行业相关利益参与方的具体情况,构建了由政府、供应商、共享单车运营平台和消费者组成的四方演化博弈模型。其中:政府因其监管成本、税收及环境效益等因素自愿性选择可以采用监管或不监管的策略;供应商会因其基础收益、政府的政策性奖励及机会成本等因素自愿性选择“参与回收”策略或“不参与回收”策略;运营平台会因其基础收益、政府带来的补贴或罚金及机会成本因素自愿性选择“构建回收渠道”策略或“不构建回收渠道”策略;消费者会因其基础收益、政府的政策性奖励及机会成本等因素自愿性选择“参与回收”策略或“不参与回收”策略。该研究分析四方博弈主体的博弈过程以及稳定策略,运用MATLAB软件进行数值仿真,获得四方主体的演化路径。结果表明:政府与消费者会随着时间的推移逐渐退出回收参与,而运营平台和供应商的回收参与力度与本身的利润收益率有关。政府应该将监管的费用、给予消费者的补贴等转移到提高企业收益转化率,以有效促进废旧共享单车的回收率,提升环境效益。In recent years,the recycling of used shared bicycles has seriously lagged behind,which has caused environmental pollution and resource waste.To foster green and low-carbon development as well as to stimulate the efficient recycling of used shared bicycles for improved environmental performance,this paper constructs a four-party evolutionary game model that includes the government,operation platforms,suppliers,and consumers,who are the stakeholders of the current bicycle-sharing industry.Among them,the government can voluntarily choose to adopt the‘regulatory or non-regulatory’strategy based on its regulatory cost,tax,and environmental benefits,while suppliers can voluntarily choose to adopt the‘participating in recycling’strategy or the‘non-participating in recycling’strategy based on their basic revenue,government policy incentives,and opportunity costs.Operation platforms can voluntarily choose the‘building recycling channels’strategy or‘not building recycling channels’strategy based on their basic revenue,government subsidies or fines,and opportunity cost factors.Consumers can voluntarily choose the‘participating in recycling’strategy or‘non-participating in recycling’strategy along with the suppliers based on their basic income,government policy incentives,and opportunity cost factors.This paper further analyzes the game process and stability strategy of associated agents and obtains meaningful conclusions.Finally,MATLAB software is used for numerical simulation to analyze the evolution paths of the agents.The results show that:the government and consumers will gradually withdraw from their participation in the recycling process over time,and the participation efforts of operation platforms and suppliers are related to their own profit yield.The government should reallocate regulatory costs and subsidies to consumers to improve the income conversion rate of enterprises,effectively promote the recycling rate of used shared bicycles,and enhance environmental performance.

关 键 词：共享单车回收 生产者责任延伸 四方演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]