异质性环境规制策略互动如何影响碳排放?  

How the Heterogeneous Environmental Regulatory Strategies Interactions Affects Carbon Emissions?

作　　者：张琳杰 ZHANG Linjie(School of Economics,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang Jiangxi 330013,China;Institute of Foreign Economics,Guizhou Academy of Social Science,Guiyang Guizhou 550002,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学经济学院,江西南昌330013 [2]贵州省社会科学院对外经济研究所,贵州贵阳550002

出　　处：《生态经济》2023年第9期179-188,共10页Ecological Economy

基　　金：江西省博士后科研项目择优资助项目“后脱贫时代生态贫困多维测度及协同治理研究”(2021KY14)。

摘　　要：中国式分权治理的制度背景下,环境规制成为地区间流动性资源争夺的博弈手段,明晰异质性环境规制的策略互动效应是解释环境规制非完全执行现象的关键所在。论文将环境规制策略互动与碳排放纳入统一的分析框架,就区域间环境规制的策略性行为及其对碳排放的影响进行规范性分析。研究发现:中国省域间异质性环境规制存在显著的空间策略互动,市场型和环保型环境规制呈现互补性策略互动,而行政型、公众型和技术型环境规制则表现为替代性策略互动;纯粹的环境规制整体上具有碳排放抑制效应,而异质性环境规制策略互动对碳排放的影响则存在明显差异,“以邻为壑”现象普遍存在;地方政府竞争参与进一步诱发环境规制策略互动的“逐底效应”和“绿色悖论”难题,最终表现出显著的碳排放促增效果。论文据此提出,中国在破解环境规制绿色悖论的过程中,需要匡正地方政府无序竞争行为并改革中国分权激励机制,建立区域协同治理模式,同时强化异质性环境规制的多元化实施路径,加速区域协同治理进程。Under the institutional background of Chinese-style decentralization governance,environmental regulation has become a game means of competition for liquidity resources between regions.Clarifying the strategic interaction effect of heterogeneous environmental regulation is the key to explain the phenomenon of incomplete implementation of environmental regulation and the problem of carbon transfer.This paper incorporates the strategic interaction of environmental regulation and carbon transfer into a unified analytical framework,and conducts a normative analysis on the strategic behavior of inter-regional environmental regulation and the resulting carbon transfer effect.The study found that there are significant spatial strategic interactions among heterogeneous environmental regulations among provinces in China.Among them,market-based and environmental-friendly regulations exhibit complementary strategic interactions,while administrative,public,and technical regulations exhibit alternative strategic interactions.Pure environmental regulation has an overall carbon emission inhibitory effect,while the carbon transfer effect caused by the interaction of heterogeneous environmental regulation strategies is significantly different.The competitive participation of local governments further induces the“bottom-to-bottom effect”and“green paradox”problems of the interaction of environmental regulation strategies,and finally shows a significant effect of promoting carbon emissions.This paper proposes that China needs to correct the disorderly competition behavior of local governments,establish a regional collaborative governance model,strengthen the diversified implementation paths of heterogeneous environmental regulation,and accelerate the process of regional collaborative governance.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 异质性环境规制 策略互动 碳排放 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程]