河流水污染跨区域合作治理机制研究——基于三方演化博弈方法  

Research on transboundary cooperative mechanisms for river pollution governance——Based on the tripartite evolutionary game theory

作　　者：杨悦 刘翼 卢全莹 张卓颖 YANG Yue;LIU Yi;LU Quanying;ZHANG Zhuoying(School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China;School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Technology,Beijing 100124,China;State Key Laboratory of Tibetan Plateau Earth System,Environment and Resources(TPESER),Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100101,China;Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京100190 [2]北京工业大学经济与管理学院,北京100124 [3]中国科学院青藏高原研究所青藏高原地球系统与资源环境全国重点实验室,北京100101 [4]中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院,北京100190

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2023年第6期1815-1836,共22页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71988101,71874183)。

摘　　要：现有的生态补偿机制主要通过内化上游重污染地区产生水污染的负外部性促进流域沿岸的水污染治理合作,然而非重污染地区水污染治理活动的正外部性也会导致其它地区产生“搭便车”动机,阻碍治污合作的开展.文章基于三方演化博弈理论对这种搭便车动机产生的内在原因以及存在的影响进行了理论分析.结果表明,当河流自上而下依次流经一个重污染上游地区与两个需要洁净水资源的下游地区时,若上游地区控制排污量,最下游的地区会出现搭便车的行为;若上游地区排污量较高,最下游地区会参与治污合作,但条件是其分得的来自上游的生态补偿金高于其治水合作中分担的成本,这会导致关于治污合作的成本收益分配不公平,合作难以开展.中下游地区对河流造成的二次污染一定程度上会缓解这种问题.文章提出了一个用于解决该问题的转移支付机制,预先令最下游地区支付一定额度的资金作为流域协同治理基金以对治水成本进行补偿,可以更好地促进下游城市间的水污染治理合作.The current ecological compensation mechanisms can promote cooperation between upstream and downstream regions along a river by internalizing the negative externalities of water pollution caused by the upstream region.But the positive externalities of water pollutants elimination by those regions with low pollutant emission may also result in motivations for free-riding in some regions and hinder the cooperation on water pollution governance.The study theoretically analyses the internal mechanism and influence of this “free-riding motivation” under the circumstance of three regions of which one upstream discharges pollutants into the river and the others downstream in sequence need to decontaminate the pollutants to get clean water.When the upstream region chooses to discharge pollutants up to the standard to avoid paying ecological compensation to the region in the middle reaches,the most downstream region has a motivation for “free-riding”.When the upstream region chooses to discharge excessive pollutants,the downstream region will participate in the water pollution governance cooperation only when the ecological compensation shared from the upstream region exceeds the cost of water pollution control it shares,which will lead to an unfair cost-benefit distribution and cause difficulties in negotiation.The secondary pollution caused by the region in the middle reaches may alleviate this problem to some extent.By paying a certain amount of funds in advance as a river basin collaborative governance fund,the downstream region will be more motivated to participate in water pollution governance cooperation.

关 键 词：水污染 跨区域协同治理 生态补偿 三方演化博弈 搭便车 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程]