CEO并购补偿会影响股东财富吗?  

Does M&A Compensation Affect Shareholder Wealth?

作　　者：张洽 张淑仪 黄维娜 ZHANG Qia;ZHANG Shu-yi;HUANG Wei-na

机构地区：[1]西安科技大学管理学院 [2]广东金融学院

出　　处：《科学决策》2023年第7期99-116,共18页Scientific Decision Making

摘　　要：目标公司CEO的并购补偿是否会影响股东财富?以2009~2021年被收购的2946个目标公司为样本采用实证研究法探究了目标公司CEO并购补偿对股东财富的影响。研究发现:CEO并购补偿对股东财富的影响在不同预期协同效应下具有显著差异,预期协同效应较高时降低了目标公司股东财富,预期协同效应较低时,提高了目标公司股东财富。当目标公司存在盈余管理时,CEO并购补偿对目标公司股东财富的负面影响更加显著。进一步分析了不同协同效应下目标公司CEO并购补偿对股东财富影响的作用机制,目标公司发放并购补偿的程度及CEO留任可能性是其主要原因。文章丰富了国内以目标公司为视角研究并购中CEO薪酬与股东代理问题的文献,为规范目标公司CEO在并购中的行为、提高股东财富提供了理论支持与经验证据。Does M&A compensation of CEO of target company affect shareholder wealth?Taking 2946 target companies acquired from 2009 to 2021 as samples,this paper uses the empirical research method to explore the impact of CEO compensation on shareholder wealth.It is found that the impact of CEO compensation on shareholder wealth is significantly different under different expected synergies.When the expected synergies are high,the wealth of shareholder of the merged party is reduced,while when the expected synergies are low,the wealth of shareholder of the merged party is increased.When the target company has earnings management,the negative impact of CEO compensation on the shareholder wealth of the target company is more significant.The effect mechanism of CEO compensation on shareholder wealth under different synergies is further analyzed.The degree of compensation and the possibility of CEO retention are the main reasons.This paper has enriched the domestic literature on CEO compensation and shareholder agency in M&A from the perspective of target company,providing theoretical support and empirical evidence for standardizing CEO behavior in M&A and improving shareholder wealth.

关 键 词：CEO并购补偿 股东财富 目标公司 并购溢价 

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