知识程度主义的构成论证  

Epistemic Gradualism's Argument from Components

作　　者：赖长生 LAI Chang-sheng(School of Humanities,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200240,China)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学人文学院,上海200240

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2023年第5期39-44,106,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“知识程度主义研究”(22CZX065)。

摘　　要：知识论传统观点认为,“知道”是个非是即否的绝对概念而非程度性概念。近年来兴起的知识程度主义挑战了这一传统,主张命题之知具有程度性,“知道”也有质量上的好坏之别。过往程度主义者们所惯用的论证思路是“构成论证”。该论证主张,命题之知的诸多构成要件(如确证、信念、乃至真)都具有程度性,因此知识本身也具有程度性。然而,从知识构成要件的程度性并不能直接推出知识本身的程度性,几种不同版本的构成论证都存在逻辑缺环。缺环的症结在于忽视了知识程度性的外部维度,即“知”与“不知”间并不存在泾渭分明的门槛。将命题之知视作一个光谱性概念能补齐这重论证,从而达至更完整的程度主义。An epistemological orthodox view holds that knowing that p is an absolute‘yes-or-no'affair rather than something that comes in degrees.The rising epistemic gradualist theory challenges this orthodoxy by arguing that knowledge-that is a gradable concept.The predominant form of argument for gradualism in the current literature is the argument from component,according to which knowledge is gradable because its various components(e.g.justification,belief,truth)are gradable.I will show that the argument from components involves a non-sequitur:the alleged gradability of knowledge's components cannot ensure the gradability of knowledge per se.The crux of this logical lacuna lies in that the argument neglects the external gradability of knowledge,viz,there is no clear-cut threshold between knowledge and lack thereof.The lacuna can be mended by seeing knowledge-that as a spectrum concept such that a more complete gradualist picture can be achieved.

关 键 词：知识程度主义 知识绝对主义 构成论证 命题之知 门槛问题 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]