知识产权搭售的反垄断法分析方法革新——从杠杆分析走向秩序测试  

Innovation of Anti-Monopoly Analysis Method in Intellectual Property Tying——from Leverage Analysis to Blockade Test

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作  者:孙瑜晨 Sun Yuchen

机构地区:[1]中国政法大学民商经济法学院

出  处:《竞争政策研究》2023年第4期62-73,共12页Competition Policy Research

基  金:2021年度教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金“数字经济时代反垄断法必需设施理论的类型化适用研究”(21YJC820036)。

摘  要:对于知识产权搭售,反垄断规制者习惯运用杠杆测试,即支配性企业通过搭售安排将知识产权的竞争排斥力从搭售品市场传导至被搭售品市场就可能招致反垄断责任。只要行为人有市场支配地位且满足单一产品要件,上述传导效应就被推定自动和自发进行,但没有经济和法律学说能对传导动机、传导机理及传导损害进行解释。实际上正确的分析应立足于维护竞争秩序,密切观察搭售是否对相邻市场的竞争产生封堵效果,而不是臆断杠杆是否传导。由于知识产权搭售兼具正、负效应,这要求其应达到“排除”竞争(通道被封锁)而非“限制”竞争(通道变狭窄)的程度才具有当罚性。For intellectual property tying,antitrust regulators are accustomed to using the leverage test.The dominant enterprise may incur antitrust liability by conducting the boundary exclusion of intellectual property from the tying product market to the tied product market through tying arrangement.As long as the commercial entity has a dominant market position and meets the requirements such as single product,leverage conduction is presumed to proceed automatically and spontaneously,but there is no economic and legal doctrine that can explain the motivation,mechanism and damage of the conductivity.The relevant analysis should be based on the maintenance of the competition order,and the regulators should closely observe whether the tying behavior has foreclosed the competition channel,rather than presuming whether the leverage is conducted.Intellectual property tying behavior has both positive and negative effects,which requires that this behavior can be punished only when it reaches the degree of"excluding"competition(the channel is blocked)rather than"restricting"competition(the channel becomes narrow).

关 键 词:知识产权搭售 竞争秩序 竞争通道 单一垄断利润 价格歧视 

分 类 号:F204[经济管理—国民经济] D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]

 

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