上级控权、属地自主权与“过度”应急行为的发生——与丁煌、张绍飞商榷  

Superior Control,Territorial Autonomy and the Occurrence of“Excessive”Emergency Actions——Discussions with Ding Huang and Zhang Shaofei

作　　者：吴新叶 Wu Xinye

机构地区：[1]同济大学政治与国际关系学院,上海200092 [2]同济大学中国特色社会主义理论研究中心,上海200092

出　　处：《探索与争鸣》2023年第6期76-83,178,共9页Exploration and Free Views

基　　金：科技部国家重点研发计划“多元矛盾纠纷成因分析及疏导技术研究与应用示范”(2021YFC3300500-01);国家社科基金重大项目“党的十八大以来党领导社会建设的实践与经验研究”(22ZDA089)。

摘　　要：因其特有的脆弱性和不确定性,突发事件治理是一项世界性难题。表面上,当前中国治理实践中存在的“过度”应急现象是地方官员主观选择的结果,而本质上则是属地管理在落地过程中的权责关系问题,主要表现为上级控权与属地自主性权力之间的失衡。在法理上,属地管理原则界定了彼此的权力边界,而在落地中总存在强度差异。淬炼属地管理的法治成色,需要平衡控权与自主性权力,具体为强化党的领导这一“超级机制”、进一步规范权力与责任、引入知识权力和第三方机制等。Emergency management is a global challenge due to its inherent vulnerability and uncertainty.Superficially,the“excessive”emergency phenomenon observed in current governance practices in China is attributed to local officials'choices.However,fundamentally,it stems from the issue of power and responsibility in the implementation process of territorial management,primarily characterized by an imbalance between superior control and territorial autonomy.Legally,the principle of territorial management defines the boundaries of power,but variations in intensity persist during implementation.To refine the legal aspects of territorial management,a balance between control power and autonomous power is required.This entails strengthening the“super mechanism”of Party leadership,further standardizing power and responsibility,and introducing knowledge-based power and thirdparty mechanisms.

关 键 词：突发事件 过度应急 上级控权 自主性权力 权力平衡 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学]