损失规避与信用担保对供应链决策与协调的影响  

The Impact of Loss Aversion and Credit Guarantee on Supply Chain Decision-making and Coordination

作　　者：蒋乐莲 代建生 罗治洪[1] JIANG Le-lian;DAI Jian-sheng;LUO Zhi-hong(School of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650504,China;School of Economics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004,China)

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,云南昆明650504 [2]燕山大学经济管理学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《系统工程》2023年第4期71-79,共9页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71762021);河北省自然科学基金资助项目(G2022203005)。

摘　　要：本文基于信用担保契约,考虑资金约束零售商具有损失规避特性,研究损失规避偏好和信用担保比例对供应链决策和渠道协调的作用。首先刻画了供应链金融系统参与方的最优决策,并实施比较静态分析,研究表明:供应链金融系统中参与方的最优决策受到零售商损失规避程度和信用担保比例的影响。在此基础上,分析了供应链的协调问题,发现具有信用担保的批发价格契约可以协调供应链,并且损失规避程度和信用担保比例都会对协调条件产生影响。最后,对数理分析内容进行验证。On assumption that the retailer is capital-constrained and the supplier provides credit guarantee,this paper study the impacts of loss aversion degree and credit guarantee coefficient on supply chain decision-making and coordination.Firstly,it characterizes the optimal decisions of all participants in the supply chain and carries out sensitivity analysis.The research shows that the optimal decision of participants will be affected by the degree of loss aversion and credit guarantee coefficient.In the following,coordination of supply chain is studied,and it is found that the wholesale price-contract with partial credit guarantee can coordinate the supply chain,and the degree of loss aversion and credit guarantee coefficient will have an impact on the conditions of coordination.Finally,the content of mathematical analysis is verified.

关 键 词：资金约束 损失规避 信用担保 供应链协调 批发价格契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]