考虑零售商实行歧视行为的两阶段动态定价策略研究  

Research on a two-period dynamic pricing strategy for retailer′s discriminatory behavior

作　　者：程明宝 张景凌 李子怡 于秀丽[3] CHENG Mingbao;ZHANG Jingling;LI Ziyi;YU Xiuli(Management College,Zhongkai University of Agriculture and Engineering,Guangzhou 510225,China;School of Business,Nanjing University of Information Science&Technology,Nanjing 210044,China;School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou 510520,China)

机构地区：[1]仲恺农业工程学院管理学院,广东广州510225 [2]南京信息工程大学商学院,江苏南京210044 [3]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2023年第5期156-166,共11页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(21YJA630008);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2021SJZDA175);广东省高校特色创新项目(2014WTSCX028)。

摘　　要：消费者对产品使用的习惯性将影响其复购选择,而企业根据消费者的历史消费行为制定相应的价格策略也影响着消费者的行为。本文构建了一个两阶段动态定价模型,研究企业是否存在歧视行为及消费者的产品习惯程度对企业定价策略的影响,利用博弈方法得到了不同情境下的制造商和零售商的最优策略。研究表明:(1)消费者对产品的习惯程度不仅能够影响消费者行为,也能影响企业定价策略;(2)转移成本加大了企业对消费者的歧视程度;(3)企业倾向于采取歧视定价策略即给新客户提供价格优惠而给老客户收取高价有利于自身利益最大化;(4)企业第一阶段的市场份额不能影响第二阶段定价,但能够影响企业两阶段利润。Consumer behavior has become an important factor affecting enterprise′s decision-making.Nowadays,with the wide application of big data technology and artificial intelligence,retailers can easily identify consumers which can create opportunities to implement differential pricing for different consumers.More specifically,consumers′re-purchasing behavior will be affected by consumers′attitude towards products,such as habitual difference and preference of consumers.In addition,the switching cost also affects both consumer behavior and enterprise decision,so it will be taken as one of the research factors in this paper.In order to study the influence of price discrimination and consumers′product habitual difference on products on firms′pricing strategies,this paper constructs two-period dynamic game based on the Hotelling′s idea.In the first period,duopoly firms compete on price and gain their market shares,and segment the market based on consumer information in case of the influence of price discrimination and switching cost on pricing decisions in the second period.After that,we figure out the optimal strategy of manufacturer and retailer in different situations.Firstly,we consider the pricing strategies with consumers′product habitual difference on products.By using reverse induction,we obtain the pricing strategies of the enterprises in the second period,and then figure out the pricing strategies of the first period.It′s turned out that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and the optimal equilibrium solution.Obviously,it can be found that consumers′product habitual difference on products affects the pricing behavior of firms.The duopoly firms implement the similar pricing strategy to each other for their consumers,and they charge the same price to the same category of consumers.In the first period,no discrimination against consumers from the two firms is considered,while both of them price new and old consumers differently in the second period.In particular,the two firms both make low price st

关 键 词：动态定价模型 纳什均衡 价格歧视 定价策略 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]