国家审计对董事联结企业盈余管理的外溢效应研究  

The Spillover Effect of Government Audit on Earnings Management of Director-interlocked Enterprises

作　　者：王海林[1] 常正伟 Wang Hailin;Chang Zhengwei

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,100070

出　　处：《审计研究》2023年第4期27-40,共14页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(项目批准号:72172098)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：作为国家治理体系的重要部分,国家审计的作用不只体现在对被审计单位的直接效应,还体现在通过一定组织和人员产生的间接影响。研究发现,国家审计可以经被审计企业的连锁董事向董事联结企业溢出,抑制联结企业的盈余管理;连锁董事及联结企业的不同特征在国家审计对联结企业盈余管理治理中发挥了不同作用。国家审计对董事联结企业盈余管理的抑制有利于提高资本市场信息效率,降低注册会计师的审计收费。研究结果不仅证明了国家审计的监督作用可以经连锁董事向非被审计企业外溢,一定程度上打开了国家审计对董事联结企业盈余管理作用的“黑箱”,也有助于更全面认识国有企业连锁董事的积极作用,更全面准确评价国家审计的监督治理效应。As an important part of national governance system,the role of government audit is not limited to the direct effect on the audited entity,but also the indirect impact through some organizations and personnel.This paper finds that government audit can overflow into director-interlocked enterprises through the interlocking directors of the audited enterprises and inhibit the earnings management of the director-interlocked enterprises.The study also find that different characteristics of interlocking directors and affiliated enterprises play different roles in such governance of director-interlocked enterprises'earnings management,and the inhibition by government audit on earnings management of director-interlocked enterprises is conducive to raising the information efficiency of the capital market and reducing the audit fees of certified public accountants.The results not only prove that the oversight function of government audit can overflow from the director interlocks to the non-audited enterprises,but to some extent open the"black box"for the role of government audit in the earnings management of the enterprises connected by the directors.It also helps us to fully understand the positive role of the director interlocks of state-owned enterprises,and evaluate the oversight and governance effect of government audit in a more comprehensive and accurate way.

关 键 词：国家审计 连锁董事 盈余管理 外溢效应 语调 

分 类 号：F239.44[经济管理—会计学] F275[经济管理—国民经济]