理性选择下的“工具性自利”——西欧政党政府公投机制的动因分析  

Examining the Motivations for Referendum Use in Western European Party Governments: A Rational Choice Analysis of Instrumental Self-Interest

作　　者：胡淑佳 Hu Shujia(Shanghai Municipal Party School)

机构地区：[1]中共上海市委党校(上海行政学院)党的建设教研部

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2023年第4期147-157,共11页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

摘　　要：文章首先区分了两种不同的公投模式,即“主动控制模式”和“被动触发模式”,并从两种模式中分别选择一个典型案例——瑞士和英国,对两个国家引入和使用公投机制的过程进行追踪分析。文章发现,政党政府对公投机制的接纳并非受民主信仰驱使而主动追求的结果,更多是一种理性计算下的“工具性自利”行为。各政党对公投机制的态度转变始终遵循利益首位原则,原本反对公投的政党会因为利益需要而接受公投,而原本倍加推崇公投的政党也可能会因为利益变化不再支持公投。对公投机制的工具性使用越来越成为西方政党在危机中“自保”、实现“自利”目标的重要手段。This study aims to examine the paradox of why party governments,who typically control the political agenda,introduce or use referendum mechanisms for the transfer of power.Most existing studies suggest that Western European party governments introduce or use referendums mainly to respond to the needs and discontent of the people.However,this paper proposes an alternative conclusion.The study begins by distinguishing two different referendum modes,namely the active control mode and the passive trigger mode,and selects Switzerland and the United Kingdom from each of the two models for case studies.The paper finds that the acceptance of the referendum mechanism by Western party governments is not due to their belief in democracy,but rather an instrumental self-interest based on rational calculation.

关 键 词：政党政府公投 机制理性选择 工具性自利 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]