卖空机制与商业信用二次配置——基于融资融券制度的准自然实验  

Short Selling Mechanism and Redistribution of Trade Credit:A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on Margin Trading System

作　　者：段超颖 张文龙[1] 郑睿 Duan Chaoying;Zhang Wenlong;Zheng Rui

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学金融学院,山西太原030000

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2023年第9期56-67,共12页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“基于生产网络和商业信用网络耦合的宏观经济波动问题研究”(批准号:20BJL016)。

摘　　要：本文以2007―2021年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究卖空机制的引入对商业信用二次配置的影响。研究发现,卖空机制的引入可有效约束企业商业信用二次配置,而且该约束作用对于供应链议价能力高、内部财务风险高、科技含量高和国有等四类企业表现更加明显。进一步地,卖空机制在约束商业信用二次配置的同时,可以促进企业的创新投入和实业投资。作用机理检验表明,卖空机制通过减少企业超额融资、提升股价信息含量与治理管理层自利行为,进而减少商业信用二次配置。本文为管控供应链金融风险、防止金融与实体经济风险交叉传染以及促进企业“脱虚向实”提供了有益启示。Using the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2021,this paper studies the effect of the introduction of the short selling mechanism on the redistribution of trade credit.It is found that the introduction of the short selling mechanism can effectively constrain the redistribution of trade credit,and the constraint is more obvious for four types of enterprises,namely,high bargaining power in the supply chain,high internal financial risk,high technology content and state-owned enterprises.Further,the short selling mechanism can promote innovation and industrial investment while restraining the redistribution of trade credit.The mechanism test shows that the short selling mechanism reduces the redistribution of trade credit by the following measures,namely,reducing the excess financing of enterprises,improving the information content of stock prices and governing the self-interested behaviour of management.This study provides useful insights for controlling supply chain financial risks,preventing risk contagion between the financial and real economy,and promoting enterprises’“industrialization and definancialization.”

关 键 词：卖空机制 融资融券制度 商业信用二次配置 影子银行业务 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]