微观心灵存在吗?——构成性泛心论的两个疑点  

Are There Any Micro-minds in the World?——Two Doubts on Constitutive Panpsychism

作　　者：王晓阳 林崧驰 WANG Xiao-yang;LIN Song-chi

机构地区：[1]厦门大学哲学系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《湖北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2023年第5期132-139,F0003,共9页Journal of Hubei University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“他心问题的基础理论研究”(20BZX030);国家社会科学基金重大项目“人工认知对自然认知挑战的哲学研究”(21&ZD061)。

摘　　要：泛心论近年来在心灵哲学领域悄然复兴,尤其是构成性泛心论受到了诸多青睐。构成性泛心论备受青睐的一个主要原因在于,它似乎遵守了演化连续性原则,因而与演化论相兼容。然而,组合问题依旧困扰着构成性泛心论者。经由对组合问题的深入分析,我们为以下两点怀疑提供了辩护:首先,即便构成性泛心论遵守了演化连续性原则,但是却违背了演化局限性原则,因而很可能与演化论并不兼容;其次,构成性泛心论者并没有提供足够的理由或证据使得我们能够相信,微观心灵是真实存在的。如果这两点怀疑是合理的,那么我们就没有理由相信,构成性泛心论的确比物理主义更具有理论竞争优势。Panpsychism has recently revived in philosophy of mind,particularly the constitutive panpsychism.One of the main reasons for constitutive panpsychism is that it seems to follow the principles of evolutionary continuity,thus possessing the compatibility with the evolutionary hypothesis.However,the combinatorial problem still hinders the constitutive panpsychists.After an in-depth analysis of the combinatorial problem,we have compelling evidence to suggest that the following two doubts can be successfully defended:First,even though the constitutive panpsychism observes the principle of evolutionary continuity,it violates the principle of evolutionary limitation,thus likely rendering it incompatible with the evolutionary hypothesis.Second,constitutive panpsychists does not provide sufficient reasons or evidences to convince us of the existence of micro-minds.If these two doubts are justified,there is no reason to believe that constitutive panpsychism has a greater theoretical competitive advantage than physicalism.

关 键 词：构成性泛心论 物理主义 演化论 组合问题 微观心灵 

分 类 号：B08[哲学宗教—哲学理论] N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]