经济增长有助于官员晋升吗?——不同类型晋升锦标赛与江苏省县官证据  

Does Economic Performance Help the Promotion of Chinese Officials?——Different Types of Tournament and Evidence from County Leaders in Jiangsu Province

作　　者：吴延兵[1,2] WU Yanbing(School of Economics,University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488,China;Institute of Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100836,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学经济学院,北京102488 [2]中国社会科学院经济研究所,北京100836

出　　处：《经济与管理评论》2023年第5期52-69,共18页Review of Economy and Management

基　　金：中国社会科学院创新工程项目“公司治理、金融与创新增长”。

摘　　要：基于不同的经济增长业绩量化方式,提出官员晋升的绝对业绩锦标赛、横向标尺锦标赛和纵向标尺锦标赛假说,利用1983-2020年江苏省县官(县委书记和县长)数据检验理论假说。控制县官特征、市官特征、县经济特征后,没有发现不同类型晋升锦标赛假说的支持证据。稳健性检验和异质性分析表明,各类晋升锦标赛假说依然不成立。职务次数、在任年数、职业经历等个体特征是县官晋升的关键因素,这表明基层官场遵循着程式化晋升规则。Based on different economic growth index,this paper proposes three types of official promotion tournament hypotheses:absolute performance tournament,horizontal yardstick tournament and vertical yardstick tournament,and uses the data of county leaders in Jiangsu province during 1983-2020 to test these hypotheses.Controlling for individual characteristics of county leaders as well as prefecture-level leaders,this paper finds no evidence supporting different promotion tournament hypothesis.Sensitivity tests and heterogeneity analysis show that empirical results remain robust.We find that individual characteristics such as tenure and career experience are the key factors in the promotion,which indicates that county-level officials conform to step-by-step promotion rules.

关 键 词：绝对业绩锦标赛 横向标尺锦标赛 纵向标尺锦标赛 经济增长 县官 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]