基于信号博弈的工程总承包联盟声誉激励研究  

Reputation Incentive for Union Engineering General Contracting Based on Signaling Game

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作  者:徐碧霄 刘迅[1] 刘德馨 XU Bixiao;LIU Xun;LIU Dexin(School of Civil Engineering,Suzhou University of Science and Technology,Suzhou 215000,China,E-mail:liuxun8127@163.com;School of Business,Suzhou University of Science and Technology,Suzhou 215000,China)

机构地区:[1]苏州科技大学土木工程学院,江苏苏州215000 [2]苏州科技大学商学院,江苏苏州215000

出  处:《工程管理学报》2023年第4期19-24,共6页Journal of Engineering Management

基  金:国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目(72201188);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2020SJA1394);江苏省研究生实践创新计划项目(SJCX23_1723)。

摘  要:在设计和施工企业联合进行工程总承包的情境下,联合体总承包商如何构建各联合单位间合理的激励机制,是发挥联合体总承包优势、实现工程总承包项目优化的关键。将联合体总承包优化事项视为单独的子项目,以“经济人”假设为基础,利用信号传递的动态重复博弈理论,建立盟主企业对其他承包企业的声誉激励模型。基于工程总承包联盟内各方追求自身利益最大化视角,设计该模型求解算法,通过模型结果分析激励条件和效用。经案例分析验证了声誉激励方法的可行性,以期为联合体工程总承包项目实践提供指导。When designing enterprises and construction enterprises are united to carry out a general contracting project,how to build a reasonable incentive mechanism is the key to taking full advantage of both sides,and realizing the optimization of the contract project.In this paper,an incentive mechanism based on a signaling game for engineering general contracting projects of design and construction unions is proposed.It is built by the following steps:firstly,each optimization issue of the union general contracting project is regarded as a separate component;then,under the hypothesis of"economic man",the dynamic replication of signal transmission is considered,according to the game theory,the reputation incentive model of union general contracting project optimization is established;then,the optimal effort degrees of all parties are solved to maximize respective profits of design and construct enterprises;further,the solution algorithm is designed,and the incentive conditions and utility are analyzed through the results.A case study in this study is conducted to verify the feasibility of the incentive method.It is hoped that this method can provide guidance for union engineering general contracting projects.

关 键 词:工程总承包 动态联盟 信号博弈 声誉激励 

分 类 号:F284[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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