Design and Selection of Pharmaceutical Innovation Incentive Policies:Subsidy or Inclusion in Health Insurance Plan  

作　　者：Xinxin ZHANG Chenglin SHEN Junran HUANG 

机构地区：[1]School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300384,China [2]School of Economics and Management,Tiangong University,Tianjin 300387,China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science and Information》2023年第4期427-450,共24页系统科学与信息学报（英文）

基　　金：Supported by the National Social Science Fund of China(18BGL045)。

摘　　要：A critical problem plaguing regulators in promoting pharmaceutical innovation is to design and select efficient incentive policies. In this study, we develop a stylized model comprising a regulator and two representative drug producers to evaluate the effects of three incentive policies: Innovation subsides, inclusion new drugs in the health insurance plan, and the combination of the above two policies(also called hybrid policy). Our analysis shows that innovation subsidies and inclusion of new drugs in the health insurance plan can both promote pharmaceutical innovation, but their incentive effects vary in different policy objectives. Specifically, if the regulator aims to improve patient welfare, he should incorporate new drugs into the health insurance plan to expand the accessibility of new drug when the copayment level is low. However, if the regulator aims to improve social welfare, he should choose innovation subsidies when the copayment level is high, and the hybrid policy when the copayment level is low. In particular, with a sufficiently low copayment level, the hybrid policy allows the new drug producer, patients and the regulator to achieve Pareto improvement due to a lower regulator’s innovation subsidy expenditure, higher profits of the new drug producer and consumer surplus.

关 键 词：pharmaceutical innovation incentive policies health insurance plan innovation subsidies COMPETITION 

分 类 号：F426.72[经济管理—产业经济] R197.1[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]