碳交易制度下绿色供应链不同成本分担合同选择  

Different cost-sharing contracts choices in a green supply chain under carbon trading system

作　　者：潘晨 杨柏 冯鹤林 郝怡非 Pan Chen;Yang Bai;Feng Helin;Hao Yifei(School of Statistics and Mathematics,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China;School of Business Administration,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China;College of Science,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430081,China;College of Mathematics and Statistics,Huanggang Normal University,Huanggang 438000,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学统计与数学学院,湖北武汉430073 [2]重庆工商大学工商管理学院,重庆400067 [3]武汉科技大学理学院,湖北武汉430081 [4]黄冈师范学院数学与统计学院,湖北黄冈438000

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2023年第4期555-576,共22页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071092);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(19YJC630051);湖北省教育厅科学研究计划资助项目(Q20222906);湖北省教育厅哲学社会科学基金资助项目(21D117,22D119);黄冈师范学院2022年度“重大项目培育计划”创新团队项目(202209904).

摘　　要：研究由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的绿色供应链中,不同成本分担合同选择问题.在碳交易制度下构建零售商不分担制造商成本(记为NC)和分担制造商绿色技术研发成本(记为RC)、生产成本(记为MC)、碳交易成本(记为TC)四种博弈模型.结果表明,相对于NC情形,RC总能提高制造商碳减排水平和零售商订购数量,而另外两种博弈模型不改变这两个决策.RC总能提高制造商利润,但是只有当零售商成本分担固定比例较低时,RC才能提高零售商利润.MC不改变参与各方利润.TC会降低制造商利润,但会提高零售商利润.当零售商成本分担固定比例较低时,RC能同时实现最高制造商碳减排水平和最高参与各方利润.This paper investigates the selection of different cost-sharing contracts in a green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer.Four game models are constructed under carbon trading system:One where the retailer does not share the manufacturer’s cost(NC)and one where the retailer shares the manufacturer’s green technology R&D cost(RC),one where the retailer shares the manufacturer’s production cost(MC),and one where the retailer shares the manufacturer’s carbon trading cost(TC).Results show that,compared with NC,RC can always improve the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction and the retailer’s order quantity,while the other two have no impacts on these two decision variables.RC always increases the manufacturer’s profit,but improves the retailer’s profit only when herfixed cost-sharing proportion is low.MC does not change profits of players.Though TC reduces the manufacturer’s profit,it increases the retailer’s.When the retailer’sfixed cost-sharing proportion is low,RC realizes both the highest manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction and the highest profits for all players.

关 键 词：博弈论 绿色供应链 碳减排 成本分担合同 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]