寿险公司股权结构对经营绩效的影响——基于经理人代理成本视角  

The Influence of Shareholder Structure on Financial Performance of Life Insurance Companies:Based on the Perspective of Agent Cost of Managers

作　　者：刘璐[1] 王小涵 魏龙飞 LIU Lu;WANG Xiaohan;WEI Longfei(School of Finance,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian,Liaoning 116025,China;School of Management,Liaoning Normal University,Dalian,Liaoning 116029,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学金融学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]辽宁师范大学管理学院,辽宁大连116029

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2023年第5期19-25,共7页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(17BJY204);辽宁省教育厅基本科研项目(LJKZZ20220126);辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目(L22BJY024)。

摘　　要：基于2012—2020年我国寿险公司的面板数据,实证检验股权结构对绩效的影响并探究其作用机制。结果表明:股权集中与绩效显著负相关,股权制衡与绩效显著正相关。机制检验发现,股权集中通过增加经理人代理成本削减绩效,股权制衡通过优化此类代理成本改善绩效。异质性分析表明,股权集中对成立时间短、发展速度慢的寿险公司绩效的负面影响更为显著。鉴于此,监管部门应适当降低寿险公司股东持股比例上限,引导非控股股东积极参与公司治理。Based on the panel data of Chinese life insurance companies from 2012 to 2020,this paper empirically tests the impact of ownership structure on performance and explores its mechanism.It shows that there is a significantly negative correlation between ownership concentration and performance,and a significant positive correlation between ownership balance and performance.Mechanism tests show that ownership concentration reduces performance by increasing agency costs,while equity balance improves performance by optimizing the agency costs.Heterogeneity analyses show that ownership concentration has a more significant negative impact on the performance of life insurance companies with a short history and slow development.In view of this,the regulatory authorities should appropriately lower the shareholding ceiling of life insurance company shareholders,and guide non-controlling shareholders to actively participate in corporate governance.

关 键 词：寿险公司 股权结构 绩效 经理人代理成本 

分 类 号：F842.3[经济管理—保险]