客户估值信息共享下价格竞争的班轮公司航线联盟选择  

Route alliance selection of liner companies with pricing competition under customer valuation information sharing

作　　者：周鹏飞 孟燕萍 ZHOU Pengfei;MENG Yanping(Institute of Logistics Science&Engineering,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学物流科学与工程研究院,上海201306

出　　处：《上海海事大学学报》2023年第3期12-18,共7页Journal of Shanghai Maritime University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(18BGL103)。

摘　　要：为研究在客户估值信息共享下存在价格竞争的班轮公司的航线联盟选择,建立一个动态博弈模型,运用纳什均衡求出班轮公司的最优定价决策,并计算部分航线联盟和全航线联盟两种形式下的公司收益。结果表明,无论何种联盟形式都会提高班轮公司的市场份额,公司在不同联盟形式下的收益受客户最大估值的影响。通过比较不同联盟形式下公司的利润,得出班轮公司对不同形式联盟的选择偏好,即当客户最大估值较低时公司不会选择联盟,当客户最大估值较高时公司会选择联盟并会结成全航线联盟。To study the route alliance selection of liner companies with pricing competition under the customer valuation information sharing,a dynamic game model is established,Nash equilibrium is used to find the optimal pricing decision of liner companies,and the company incomes are calculated considering two alliance modes of part of route alliance and all of route alliance.The results show that,each alliance mode can increase the market share of liner companies,and the company income under different alliance modes is affected by the maximum valuation of customers.Through comparing the profits of companies under different alliance modes,the preference of liner companies for different alliance modes is obtained,that is,the companies will not choose the alliance when the maximum valuation of customers is low,and the companies will choose the alliance and reach all of route alliance when the maximum valuation of customers is high.

关 键 词：航线联盟 纳什均衡 客户最大估值 

分 类 号：F551[经济管理—产业经济]