基于古诺或伯川德竞争的港口合谋罚金威慑  

Fine deterrence of port collusion based on Cournot competition or Bertrand competition

作　　者：陈珊 董岗[1] CHEN Shan;DONG Gang(School of Economics&Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306

出　　处：《上海海事大学学报》2023年第3期91-99,共9页Journal of Shanghai Maritime University

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(22YJA630013)。

摘　　要：为引导港口主动背叛合谋,阻止港口间的横向合谋,在构建不同罚金模式(定额罚金、利润比例罚金、销售额比例罚金)下的定量研究模型的同时加入罚金减免比例,比较分析不同罚金模式下及不同竞争类型下合谋港口的最低罚金和罚金减免比例。研究发现:合谋罚金和罚金减免比例的增加可以降低港口间合谋的稳定性,从而形成合谋威慑;在比例罚金模式下,给予古诺竞争下背叛合谋的港口的最低罚金减免比例比伯川德竞争下的低;在贴现因子高于古诺竞争与伯川德竞争下的最低罚金相等时的贴现因子时,3种罚金模式下对古诺竞争下合谋港口的最低罚金比伯川德竞争下的低。以国内比较典型的上海港和宁波舟山港为例,当给予主动背叛合谋的港口最低罚金减免比例时,若最低罚金相同,利润比例罚金模式和销售额比例罚金模式相较于定额罚金模式对合谋的威慑更强。In order to guide ports to actively betray collusion and prevent horizontal collusion among ports,the quantitative research models under different fine modes(fixed fine,profit proportional fine and sales proportional fine)are constructed where the fine reduction ratio is added,and the minimum fine and fine reduction ratio of collusive ports under different competition types and different fine modes are compared and analyzed.It is found that:the increase of the collusion fine and the fine reduction ratio can reduce the stability of port collusion,thus forming collusion deterrence;in the proportional fine modes,the minimum fine reduction ratio given to ports that betray collusion under Cournot competition is lower than that under Bertrand competition;when the discount factor is higher than the discount factor when the minimum fine under Cournot competition is equal to that under Bertrand competition,the minimum fine for collusive ports under Cournot competition is less than that under Bertrand competition in the three fine modes.Taking the typical Shanghai Port and Ningbo Zhoushan Port as examples,when the minimum fine reduction ratio is given to ports that actively betray collusion,if the minimum fines are the same,the profit proportional fine mode and the sales proportional fine mode have a stronger deterrent effect on collusion than the fixed fine mode.

关 键 词：合谋罚金 罚金减免比例 古诺竞争 伯川德竞争 合谋威慑 

分 类 号：F552[经济管理—产业经济]