跨国界河流水资源冲突演化博弈模拟研究  

Game Simulation of Water Resource Conflict Evolution in Transboundary Rivers

作　　者：袁亮[1] 祁煜智 何伟军[1] 李闻钦 吴霞 YUAN Liang;QI Yuzhi;HE Weijun;LI Wenqin;WU Xia(School of Economics and Management,China Three Gorges University,Yichang 443002,China)

机构地区：[1]三峡大学经济与管理学院,湖北宜昌443002

出　　处：《复杂系统与复杂性科学》2023年第3期90-96,共7页Complex Systems and Complexity Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72104127,71478101);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(20YJCGJW009)。

摘　　要：为分析个体行为特征和决策偏好对水资源冲突演化的影响,应用前景价值函数构建跨国界河流水资源冲突感知收益矩阵,运用演化博弈分析上下游决策行为演化路径与结果,构建系统动力学模型进行模拟仿真。结果表明:合作决策集的选择需要满足复杂的博弈条件;当上游积极放水的感知成本、上游消极放水的感知收入、下游主动争取的感知成本增加和水资源冲突风险感知成本减少时,将降低上下游合作的概率,流域将可能爆发水资源冲突。In order to analyze the influence of individual behavioral characteristics and decision making preferences on the evolution of water resources conflicts,the authors introduced prospect theory into the evolution game of transboundary river water resources conflict analysis,applied the prospect value function to construct the perceived benefit matrix of the water resource conflicts between upstream and downstream regions,used evolutionary games to analyze the evolutionary paths and results of decision-making behaviors of upstream and downstream regions,and constructed a system dynamics model for simulation analysis.The results show that:upstream and downstream regions need to meet the complex game conditions for selection of the cooperation strategy set,and when the perceived cost of active water release from upstream,the perceived income of passive water release from upstream,the perceived cost of active pursuit increase from the downstream,and the perceived costs of water conflict risks decrease,the probability of choosing the cooperation strategy set will be reduced,and water resources conflict will occur.

关 键 词：前景理论 跨国界河流 水资源冲突 演化博弈 系统动力学 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] N941.1[自然科学总论—系统科学]