博弈视角下我国合村并居政策中相关利益主体的行为逻辑分析  

Logical Analysis of Behavior of Relevant Stakeholders Village Cohabitation Policy from the Perspective of Game in China

作　　者：李珊珊[1] 胡美玲 LI Shan-shan;HU Mei-ling(College of Economics and Management,Northeast Forestry University,Harbin 150040,China)

机构地区：[1]东北林业大学经济管理学院,哈尔滨150040

出　　处：《中国林业经济》2023年第4期9-12,共4页China Forestry Economics

基　　金：东北林业大学大学生创新训练项目(DC2023095)。

摘　　要：合村并居政策实施后农民的生产生活方式会发生改变。围绕“土地”这一要素,中央政府、地方政府、农民、开发商有不同的需求倾向,因此,四方主体在博弈中有不同的行为逻辑。中央的出发点是为了人民,而地方政府为了土地财政往往会与开发商合谋,因此失地农民在合村并居中成了较弱势方。然而,合村并居本就是为了促进农村发展,所以,农民的需求和利益是政策实施者必须关注和考虑的。After the implementation of the policy of merging villages,the production and lifestyle of farmers will change.Around the element of land,the central government,local governments,farmers,and developers have different demand tendencies,so the four parties have different behavioral logic in the game.The central government's starting point was for the people,and the local governments colluded with developers for land finance,so the landless peasants became the weaker party in the middle of the village.However,the purpose of cohabiting villages was to promote rural development,so the policy implementers should pay attention to the needs and interests of farmers.

关 键 词：合村并居 相关利益主体 博弈论 乡村振兴 城镇化 

分 类 号：F293[经济管理—国民经济]