低碳偏好下产业集群能源共享的微分博弈策略  

Differential game strategy of energy sharing in industrial clusters under low-carbon preference

作　　者：付浩言 宋力[1] FU Haoyan;SONG Li(School of Management,Shenyang University of Technology,Shenyang 110870,China)

机构地区：[1]沈阳工业大学管理学院,辽宁沈阳110870

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2023年第9期3111-3122,共12页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(22BJY135)。

摘　　要：在消费者低碳偏好下,考虑能源共享带来的低碳效应,借助微分博弈理论研究了产业集群能源共享策略问题。运用HJB方程分析了集群核心企业和配套企业在集中式决策、分散式决策以及引入成本分担契约的Stackelberg博弈3种决策情形下,双方各自的均衡策略、系统总利润以及能源共享协同效应随时间变化的最优轨迹。通过比较3种博弈结果发现,集中式决策下的能源共享协同效应、双方利润以及系统总利润都最高,Stackelberg博弈优于分散式决策,成本分担契约可以实现整体利益的协调。最后,通过数值仿真验证了理论推导结果,并分析了消费者低碳偏好和政府能源低碳补贴对产业集群能源共享的作用机制,为政府和企业决策提供了理论依据。Under the low-carbon preference of consumers,considering the low-carbon effect brought by energy sharing,the energy sharing strategy problem of industrial clusters was studied with the help of differential game theory.The HJB equation was used to analyze the optimal trajectories of equilibrium strategies,total system profits and energy sharing synergy effects over time for the core and supporting firms in three decision scenarios:centralized decision,decentralized decision,and Stackelberg game with introduction of cost-sharing contracts.By comparing the results of the three games,the result showed that the centralized decision had the highest energy sharing synergy,profit of both parties and total system profit,and the Stackelberg game was better than the decentralized decision,and the cost-sharing contract could achieve the coordination of overall interests.The theoretical derivation results were verified by numerical simulation,and the mechanisms of the effects of consumer low-carbon preferences and government energy low-carbon subsidies on energy sharing in industrial clusters were analyzed to provide a theoretical basis for government and enterprise decision-making.

关 键 词：消费者低碳偏好 产业集群 能源共享 成本分担 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] C931[经济管理—管理学]