过桥贷款融资的动态分析:银企互动和监管冲突  

A Dynamic Analysis of Bridge Loan Financing:Bank-Firm Interactions and Regulatory Conflicts

作　　者：彭俞超 沈吉[2] 高昊宇 Yuchao Peng;Ji Shen;Haoyu Gao(School of Finance,Central University of Finance and Economics;Guanghua School of Management,Peking University;School of Finance,Renmin University of China)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学金融学院 [2]北京大学光华管理学院 [3]中国人民大学财政金融学院

出　　处：《经济管理学刊》2023年第3期135-178,共44页Quarterly Journal of Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72273160、71903208)的资助;国家自然科学基金项目(72273146)的资助。

摘　　要：过桥贷款作为一种短期、临时性的民间非正规金融工具,能够帮助企业实现对银行贷款的借新还旧,从宏观上看,能够造成金融风险的跨期转移。基于上市公司数据的测算和调查问卷均表明,中国约三分之一的企业曾使用过桥贷款来完成银行贷款周转。通过构建一个包含银行-信贷员-企业三层的两期博弈模型,本文对过桥贷款影响金融稳定的理论机制进行了分析。模型结果表明,过桥贷款能够在短期内稳金融、稳投资、稳产出,对暂时遭受流动性冲击的企业进行救助,实现金融风险向未来的跨期转移。商业银行选择的最优过桥贷款规模并不能实现最优的金融稳定,监管机构需要对商业银行进行监管,从而限制商业银行对金融体系的负外部性。随着未来发生系统性风险的阈值下降(或概率上升),监管机构应该对过桥贷款采取更加严格的监管措施。本文的理论分析结论为监管部门完善对非正规融资和商业银行的监管提供了参考。Summary:Bridge loan financing,as a short-term and provisional informal financing tool,can help firms rollover loans at the micro-level and transfer risks across time at the macro-level.Though bridge loan borrowing is quite pervasive in practice,we still lack a general picture of what is going on.To this end,we match loan-level data from 19 large-scale commercial banks and financial data of firms listed on the Chinese A-share market from 2007 to 2013.With these in hand,we are able to conduct some preliminary empirics to offer several stylized facts of Chinese A-listed firms involved with bridge loan borrowing.The following results are obtained by comparing firms with bridge loan and those without bridge loans.First,those firms with bridge loan are associated with lower profitability and higher leverage ratio in the past,implying that those firms must once undergo negative business shocks and have to bear higher level of debt to be repaid before they borrow bridge loans.Second,those firms with bridge loans have higher financial costs,mainly because financing via bridge loan is more costly.Thirdly,the future return on equity and Tobin's Q for firms with bridge loan turn out to be lower.This might be because the exceptionally high financial cost of raising funds from bridge loan hinders those firms from making more productive investments and therefore worsens their long-term performance.The above empirical evidence is the first step for understanding the cause and consequence for firms to borrow bridge loans.Based on the stylized facts,the paper then constructs a two-period game-theoretical model with bank,loan officer and firm to examine the mechanism on how bridge loan financing affects financial stability.There are a continuum of firms in the economy.We first assume that the productivity of each firm is independently drawn from a distribution function across two periods and call this the"transitory productivity shock"case.Later we discuss the"persistent productivity shock"case where each firm's productivity is the

关 键 词：过桥贷款 金融风险 资源配置 非正规金融 

分 类 号：F015[经济管理—政治经济学] F830