大学科技城协同创新动态演化博弈研究  

Research on Dynamic Evolution Game of Collaborative Innovation in University Science and Technology City

作　　者：李松亮 成鹏飞 LI Song-liang;CHENG Peng-fei(School of Business,Hunan University of Science and Technology,Xiangtan 411201,China;Research Center of Big Data and Intelligent Decision,Hunan University of Science and Technology,Xiangtan 411201,China;Hunan Engineering Research Center of Big Data and Intelligent Decision for Industrial Development,Xiangtan 411201,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南科技大学商学院,湖南湘潭411201 [2]湖南科技大学大数据与智能决策研究中心,湖南湘潭411201 [3]产业发展大数据与智能决策湖南省工程研究中心,湖南湘潭411201

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2023年第8期204-213,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社科基金后期资助项目(19FGLB011);湖南省哲学社会科学基金资助项目(21YBA118);湖南省研究生科研创新项目(CX20231022)。

摘　　要：本文以政府主导运营的大学科技城为对象,构建了大学科技城协同创新动态演化博弈模型,按政府选择监管和不监管两种博弈策略,分别探讨了学研方和企业等大学科技城协同创新主体的合作策略选择,并应用Matlab对影响协同创新主体博弈策略的主要因素进行了数值仿真。研究结论表明:管委会等政府部门不监管时,学研方和企业自身利益分配和策略选择的初始意愿能有效促进演化博弈系统收敛至理想状态;管委会等政府部门实施监管时,奖励和惩罚等监管措施对学研方和企业等协同创新主体策略选择的影响显著,而且加快了演化结果收敛至理想状态的速度。As a major part of the national innovation system,collaborative innovation plays an important role in promoting high-quality economic development and enhancing national and regional innovation capacity.In university science and technology city,there are many innovation subjects,such as universities,research institutes,enterprises,management committees and so on,it gathers international and domestic innovation ele⁃ments,such as technology,talents,knowledge,capital,etc.As a new organizational model of collaborative innovation,university science and technology city has become a main base for the transformation of scientific research achievements and a sharing platform for the integration of government,enterprise,universities and research institutes,and it is of great significance for promoting the collaborative development of higher educa⁃tion,science and technology innovation and industry.However,the collaborative innovation of university sci⁃ence and technology city is faced with the lack of motivation of innovation subjects,the stagnation of innovation activities,etc.These problems may be caused by the inconsistency of the goals of innovation subjects,the lack of government guidance and supervision,the speculative behavior of innovation subjects,and so on.To solve them,the dynamic evolutionary game model is constructed in the paper.And the cooperation strategy of innova⁃tion subject is studied under the condition of supervision and non supervision of government.Matlab is used to simulate the evolution of the main factors affecting the game strategy of collaborative innovation subject.The results show that without supervision from the management committee and other government departments,the interest distribution and the initial state of strategy selection intention of universities and enterprises can effectively promote the convergence of evolutionary game system to the ideal state.When the supervision from management committee is implemented,the supervision measures include the reward and punishment have

关 键 词：大学科技城 演化博弈 协同创新 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]