差异化港口默契合谋动态博弈稳定性研究  

On stability of tacit collusion in dynamic game between differentiated ports

作　　者：蒋璐 董岗[1] JIANG Lu;DONG Gang(School of Economics and Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306

出　　处：《中国航海》2023年第3期72-79,共8页Navigation of China

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(22YJA630013)。

摘　　要：为研究区域内差异化的双寡头港口的定价策略和合谋倾向,运用改进的Hotelling模型建立单次静态博弈和动态博弈模型,计算博弈双方的均衡定价和均衡收益,将单次静态博弈和动态博弈中的均衡结果进行对比,分析默契合谋定价机理及其影响因素,并基于动态博弈和冷酷战略建立无限次重复博弈模型,分析港口在长期动态博弈中默契合谋的稳定性。结果表明只有当港口间的单位集装箱处理成本差异满足不同条件时,港口才能获得定价优势或吞吐量优势,同时发现在价格竞争中双方存在通过默契合谋进行价格操纵的可能,随着博弈次数的增多,价格领导方没有背叛合谋的动机,而价格跟随方背叛合谋的动机与港口的单位集装箱处理成本差异和临界贴现因子有关。The pricing strategy and collusion tendency of differentiated ports are studied for single static gam and sequential game by the improved Hotlling model.In order to analyze the mechanism of tacit collusion and its influencing factors of pricing,the equilibrium results between single static game and dynamic game are compared.The infinitely repeated game model is established based on sequential game and grim strategy,and the stability of tacit collusion in the long-term game is analyzed.The research finds that only when the difference in unit container handling cost between ports meets certain conditions,one of the ports can obtain the pricing advantage or throughput advantage,and there is the possibility of price manipulation through tacit collusion.The price leader has no motivation to betray collusion while the times of game increases.Meantime,the price follower's motivation for betrayal of collusion is related to the cost difference and critical discount factor.

关 键 词：差异化 价格竞争 默契合谋 动态博弈 HOTELLING模型 冷酷战略 

分 类 号：U691[交通运输工程—港口、海岸及近海工程]